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368 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
INTRODUCTION
There is none. Or, to answer the titular question more accurately, there
is not just one; instead, the proper time period to review the sufficiency of
production from an oil and gas lease will vary from case to case. Most states
that have adopted a requirement of production in paying quantities for the
maintenance of an oil and gas lease in its secondary term have converged
on a single standard: the analysis must cover a time period that is
“reasonable under the circumstances.”1 Determining whether a period is
“reasonable” for a given dispute is vital, as this judgment often decides the
outcome of the case. But for all the apparent simplicity of the standard, it
has spawned irregular results across the jurisprudence and provoked
frustration in litigants and scholars.2 
The unpredictability surrounding the accounting period question is 
unsurprising.3 Like all legal questions premised on a factfinder’s
determination of reasonableness, the answers will be multiple and, to some
degree, inconsistent. But the open-ended nature of the “reasonableness”
evaluation obscures further conceptual complications in fixing a time
period. These difficulties are, at least partly, the result of the competing 
impulses at the heart of the most popular formulation of the modern paying 
quantities test. This test is found in the Texas decision of Clifton v. 
Koontz.4 The court in Clifton attempted to weld an objective “mechanical”
test to an equitable one. Further confusion has occurred because courts
have failed to provide much explanation as to what “reasonable” means in
this context. Similarly, courts have declined to identify which
“circumstances” should count as relevant to the inquiry.
1. For instance, Bruce M. Kramer, Lease Maintenance for the Twenty-First
Century: Old Oil and Gas Law Doesn’t Die, It Just Fades Away, 41 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 15-1, § 15.06, (1995), Pshigoda v. Texaco, Inc. 703 S.W.2d 416,
419 (Tex. App. 1986), and Clifton v, Koontz 325 S.W.2d 684, 690–91 (Tex. 
1959).
2. 3 PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS AND MEYERS,
OIL AND GAS LAW § 604.6(c) (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2019) (stating that
the time period question is “one of the most perplexing problems” in the paying 
quantities issue).
3. In this Article, as in the caselaw and scholarly work on the issue, the 
period under analysis in a paying quantities dispute is referred to variously as the
“time period,” the “accounting period,” the timeframe” and so forth.
4. 325 S.W.2d 684, 691 (Tex. 1959).
342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd  15 5/21/20  8:22 AM






    





   
   
   
    
 
  
    
  
 
   
 






      
    
 
      
   
        
    
    
 




3692020] TIME PERIOD FOR A PAYING QUANTITIES ANALYSIS?
The stakes of paying quantities disputes can be high, with multi-
million-dollar verdicts often hanging in the balance. Given the centrality
of the time period question to the results of these cases, it is striking how
little direct attention it has attracted. Traditionally, trial court judges and
juries are given nearly limitless discretion as to selecting particular time
periods, with appellate opinions rarely even discussing, much less
overturning, those selections.5 However, within the last decade, a few 
high-profile decisions have overtly turned toward the issue.6 Recent 
scholarship has likewise begun to more directly engage with the
reasonable time period standard.7 The aim of this Article is to contribute 
to this trend, both by reviewing the actual applications of the standard by 
courts and analyzing the factors that ostensibly determine that application.
Part I provides an overview of the production in paying quantities
requirement, outlining the history and basic components of the standard. 
This review is a necessary setup for Part II, which summarizes the
important jurisprudence addressing the reasonable time period factor.
These decisions are largely clustered in a handful of jurisdictions and so 
Part II proceeds on a state-by-state basis.8 Though none of these decisions
are binding on outside jurisdictions, they are often influential; the Texas
decision mentioned above, Clifton v. Koontz, has been cited by courts 
5. As noted by one scholar:
The idea that the concept of paying quantities includes, as its 
chronological component, a time period of reasonable duration, is thus
vital, because it allows, within limits, for an averaging . . . However, the
time period, for all its importance, is a factor to which courts generally
have given only cursory attention, or have ignored altogether, in their 
discussions.
Douglas Hale Gross, Annotation, Meaning of “Paying Quantities” in Oil and Gas 
Lease, 43 A.L.R. 3d 8, § 7 (1972).
6. See e.g., B.P. Prod. Co. v. Laddex, Ltd 513 S.W.3d 476 (Tex. 2017), T.W.
Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 615 Pa. 199, 42 A.3d 261 (Pa. 2012), and 94 
N.E.3d 73 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017). 
7. For instance, see Alex Ritchie, A Reexamination and Reformulation of
the Habendum Clause Paying Quantities Standard Under Oil and Gas Leases, 3
OIL & GAS, NAT. RESOURCES & ENERGY J. 977, 997 (2017).
8. Two other papers provide excellent state-by-state reviews of aspects of 
paying quantities law. See Jessica E. McDonald & Zachary M. Wallen, Defining
“Production in Paying Quantities”: A Survey of Habendum Clause Cases
Throughout the United States, 90 N.D. L. REV. 383 (2014). See also Morgan L.
Simpson, Should We Cycle Onto a New Analysis: Establishing the Proper
Accounting Period for the Paying Quantities Analysis, 56 WASHBURN L.J. 355 
(2017).
342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd  16 5/21/20  8:22 AM





   
  
  












    
 









   
 
   
  
   
  
       
    
       
370 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
nationwide.9 This review of the jurisprudence will emphasize the more 
recent decisions. Then, Part III examines two of the conceptual stumbling 
blocks for the paying quantities analysis that have tripped up courts: (a) 
what function does the word “reasonable” have in this context?; and (b) 
what factual “circumstances” can and should factor into the selection of
the appropriate time period in a given dispute? Finally, Part IV offers a
modest set of recommendations for developing the issue further. This
Article argues that the flexible standard currently employed is useful in
serving the broad policy imperatives underlying the paying quantities
requirement. However, that standard needs to be given greater shape by 
courts and litigants for the traditional paying quantities tests to be cogent.
Absent any more concrete directives for factfinders when determining the
reasonableness of a given accounting span, the paying quantities 
jurisprudence will continue to be fairly unhelpful in prescribing behavior 
or predicting results. The prime virtue of the “reasonable time period”
standard is that it is elastic and, therefore, fact-sensitive; this feature can
unproblematically coexist with at least broadly predictive guidelines.
Courts can provide signposts to future factfinders by explicitly articulating
what fact circumstances should be considered in determining what counts
as a reasonable time period and establishing a baseline range or ranges of
reasonableness. Neither change would modify the existing paying 
quantities tests but would act as useful signals to the interested parties. 
I. PRODUCTION IN PAYING QUANTITIES OVERVIEW
Early mineral leases featured a variety of terms. The first commercial 
lease, from 1857, was for a fixed 15-year period.10 But fixed-term leases
proved to be less than favorable to a lessee; since the lessee faced forfeiture 
of the lease even if he had successfully obtained production, he had a weak 
bargaining position in attempting to negotiate a new lease or renew of the
prior one.11 Over the next several decades, landowners and operators 
experimented with a variety of lease terms. Consistent with common law 
property terminology, provisions governing the duration of the lease were 
referred to as “habendum” clauses—short for “habendum and tenendum,” 
Latin for “to have and to hold.”12 By the early twentieth century, the
9. From California (Lough v. Coal Oil, Inc., 217 Cal. App. 3d 1518 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1990)) and Alaska (Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 455 P.2d 
12 (Alaska 1969)) to Pennsylvania (Heath v. Dellich, No. 239 WDA 2016, 2016
WL 7232426 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2016)).
10. 3 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 2, § 601.1.
11. Id.
12. Habendum Clause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd  17 5/21/20  8:22 AM










   
  




   





   
  
  
    
 
       
    
   
    
      
      
 
     




    
       
   
   
      
 
3712020] TIME PERIOD FOR A PAYING QUANTITIES ANALYSIS?
industry settled nearly universally on the “thereafter” habendum clause.13 
A typical version of this provision reads as follows: “It is agreed that this
lease shall remain in force for a term of ten years from date and as long
thereafter as oil, or gas of whatsoever nature or kind, or either of them is
produced from said land.”14 
Such an arrangement respects the incentives of both the lessor and 
lessee. For the former, his land is only encumbered for as long as he is
receiving a benefit from it; for the latter, he will not be booted from the
leased premises if both sides are profiting from his investment.15 The 
“thereafter” clause has now been ubiquitous in oil and gas lease forms for 
over a century.16 
In most states, a mineral lease is understood to convey a fee simple
determinable interest, alternatively phrased as an interest subject to a 
special limitation.17 That limitation is the failure to produce in paying 
quantities, pursuant to the habendum clause.18 Under this conception, the
lease terminates automatically once it is no longer producing in paying
quantities. Oklahoma is the only state that clearly rejects this view, holding 
that the lessor merely possesses the power to terminate the lease if the lease
fails to produce in paying quantities—the lease does not automatically 
terminate.19 In the majority view, continued production in paying 
quantities is a condition of lease maintenance. Lease conditions should be
contrasted with the lessee’s various lease covenants, such as the covenant
of reasonable development, where the lessee is required to behave as a
reasonably prudent operator.20 On its face, the habendum clause does not
13. 3 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 2, § 601.1. 
14. Id.
15. Id. § 601.4.
16. Id.; A.W. Walker, Jr., The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an
Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 7 TEX. L. REV. 1, 14 (1928).
17. 3 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 2, § 604; Bruce M. Kramer, The 
Temporary Cessation Doctrine: A Practical Response to an Ideological Dilemma,
43 BAYLOR L. REV. 519 (1991); S. Mark McIntyre, Lessor’s Options Against
Speculative Lessees Who Refuse to Drill, 43 BAYLOR L. REV. 169 (1991). A fee
simple determinable is “an estate that will automatically end and revert to the 
grantor if some specified event occurs (e.g., “to Albert and his heirs while the
property is used for charitable purposes”); an estate in fee simple subject to a
special limitation. •Fee Simple, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
18. 3 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 2, § 604.
19. Id.
20. See Keith B. Hall, Implied Covenants and the Drafting of Oil and Gas 
Leases, 7 LSU J. ENERGY L. & RESOURCES 401 (2019) for a succinct summary of 
the covenant/condition distinction:
342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd  18 5/21/20  8:22 AM









    
  
   
 
   
 
 
   
 
  
    
 












   
 
 
    
    
    
   
        
     
    
 
       
    
372 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
prescribe good behavior or proscribe bad motives—it simply requires a
specific result. 
Beyond its refusal to adopt the “fee simple determinable” picture of
the mineral lease, Oklahoma is also distinctive in that it is one of the few
states that does not require actual production in paying quantities for
maintenance of a mineral lease in its secondary term.21 Instead, a mineral 
lease need only be capable of producing in paying quantities for the lease
to continue.22 This allows operators to voluntarily shut in wells during
periods of low prices without fear that their lease will expire. For the
remaining jurisdictions, the proof must be in the pudding: a lease cannot 
survive without constant, actual production. Still, the question of whether
a well or lease is capable of producing in paying quantities can be relevant
in those states when the lease contains a “shut-in clause” that contractually
allows the lessee to cease production for some short period of time.23 
If a lease continued for as long “thereafter” as minerals were produced,
did this mean that a single drop of new oil could keep it alive? Some early
courts thought so.24 However, the majority of courts and scholars agreed 
that a de minimis showing of mineral production was not enough.25 
Instead, they interpreted “produced” to mean “produced in paying
quantities.”26 This more expansive requirement gave recognition to the
By definition, lessors generally cannot use lease language to obtain
greater protection from implied covenants than is provided by the
jurisprudentially-recognized implied covenants. If a lessor uses the lease 
to expressly impose certain duties, those duties are express covenants,
not implied covenants. If a lessor includes in the lease language that
provides for automatic termination if a breach of an implied covenant
occurs or if a breach is not corrected within a certain time, that language
converts the implied covenant into a condition or limitation. Here, by
“limitation,” the author refers to an event or circumstance that leads to
automatic termination of the lease, without any action of the lessor. A
“condition” would be an event or circumstance that makes the lease
subject to termination at the option of the lessor.
Keith B. Hall, Implied Covenants and the Drafting of Oil and Gas Leases, 7 LSU
J. ENERGY L. & RESOURCES 401, 469 n.248 (2019).
21. McDonald & Wallen, supra note 8, at 395–97. 
22. Id.
23. For instance, see discussion infra Section II.E (discussing EnerQuest Oil
& Gas, LLC v. Plains Expl. & Prod. Co., 981 F. Supp. 2d 575 (W.D. Tex. 2013)).
24. See e.g., Gillespie v. Ohio Oil Co., 260 Ill. 169, 102 N.E. 1043, 1044 (Ill.
1913).
25. 3 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 2, § 604.5.
26. Id.
342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd  19 5/21/20  8:22 AM











   
 
    
 
 
   
  




   
 
    
     
      
 
   
    
 











   
    
    
3732020] TIME PERIOD FOR A PAYING QUANTITIES ANALYSIS?
fact that leasing parties bargain for an arrangement that continues as long 
as it is mutually profitable.27 
The “paying quantities” interpretation of “produced” naturally raised 
a further question: how much production is paying production? The
earliest constructions of the phrase took it to require a profit, such that
lease revenues had to exceed lease expenses. For example, in the 1899
case of Young v. Forest Oil Co., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
declared: “But if a well, being down, pays a profit,—even a small one, 
over the operating expenses,—it is producing in ‘paying quantities,’
though it may never repay its cost, and the operation as a whole may result 
in a loss.”28 Other courts around the country ruled similarly throughout the
first half of the twentieth century.29 This national jurisprudential trend was 
surveyed—and adopted—by the Texas Supreme Court in the 1942 matter
of Garcia v. King.30 
However, the profit-alone requirement was upended by the same court 
less than two decades later, in Clifton v. Koontz.31 In that case, the lessor
sued their lessee for cancellation of the lease. The lease in question
operated at a net loss for certain periods in the 1950s.32 For instance,
expenses exceeded revenues by $216.16 in the 16-month period between
June of 1955 and September of 1956.33 Among other things, the lessor
27. Id.
28. Young v. Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa. 243, 250, 45 A. 121, 122–23 (Pa. 1899).
29. See T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 615 Pa. 199, 229, 42 A.3d 
261, 280 (Pa. 2012) (Saylor, J., dissenting) (listing several cases following from 
the Young rationale, such as Gypsy Oil Co. v. Marsh, 1926 OK 246, 121 Okla.
135, 248 P. 329, 330 (Okla. 1926) and Barnsdall v. Boley, 119 F. 191, 198 
(C.C.N.D.W. Va. 1902)).
30. The court stated: 
So far as the lessees were concerned, the object in providing for a 
continuation of the lease for an indefinite time after the expiration of the 
primary period was to allow the lessees to reap the full fruits of the
investments made by them in developing the property. Obviously, if the 
lease could no longer be operated at a profit, there were no fruits for them
to reap. The lessors should not be required to suffer a continuation of the
lease after the expiration of the primary period merely for speculation 
purposes on the part of the lessees. Since the lease was no longer yielding 
a profit to the lessees at the termination of the primary period, the object
sought to be accomplished by the continuation thereof had ceased, and 
the lease had terminated.
164 S.W.2d 509, 513–14 (Tex. 1942).
31. 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959).
32. Id. at 687.
33. Id. at 689.
342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd  20 5/21/20  8:22 AM





   
   
   
    














    
 




   
  
 
   
 
      
 
 
   
    
   
   
374 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
argued that these losses resulted in the termination of the lease under its
habendum and “operations” clauses.34 The trial court and appellate court
both disagreed, holding that the lease had been maintained.35 
The Texas Supreme Court took up the matter in 1959. The court 
agreed with the Young and Garcia courts that a profitable well was
producing in paying quantities but denied that an unprofitable well was
ipso facto not producing in paying quantities: 
If a well pays a profit, even small, over operating expenses, it
produces in paying quantities, though it may never repay its costs,
and the enterprise as a whole may prove unprofitable.
In the case of a marginal well, such as we have here, the standard 
by which paying quantities is determined is whether or not under
all the relevant circumstances a reasonably prudent operator
would, for the purpose of making a profit and not merely for 
speculation, continue to operate a well in the manner in which the 
well in question was operated.
In determining paying quantities, in accordance with the above
standard, the trial court necessarily must take into consideration
all matters which would influence a reasonable and prudent
operator. Some of the factors are: The depletion of the reservoir
and the price for which the lessee is able to sell his produce, the
relative profitableness of other wells in the area, the operating and 
marketing costs of the lease, his net profit, the lease provisions, a 
reasonable period of time under the circumstances, and whether 
or not the lessee is holding the lease merely for speculative 
purposes.36 
The Clifton court used the term “marginal well” in a broad enough sense
to encompass wells that incurred operating losses. Such a well may still be 
producing in paying quantities in light of “all matters which would 
influence a reasonable and prudent operator.”37 The test is broken into two 
prongs: (1) the objective (or “mechanical,” “mathematical,” etc.) prong, 
wherein the court calculates whether or not the lease obtained even a small
profit, and (2) the subjective prong, where the court considers a multitude 
of other factors that indicate whether or not the operator was acting as a 
34. Id.
35. Id. at 688.
36. Id. at 690–91.
37. Id. at 691.
342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd  21 5/21/20  8:22 AM





    
     
 
  
   
 
 
   




   
 




   
  
   
 
         








   
   
 






3752020] TIME PERIOD FOR A PAYING QUANTITIES ANALYSIS?
reasonably prudent operator in the face of marginal production.38 The 
profit requirement of Young and Garcia remained but was turned inside-
out; now a failure to turn a profit was a necessary condition of lease
termination, not a sufficient one. A lessor alleging lease termination must 
prove both a failure to turn a profit and that the lessee was not acting as a 
reasonably prudent operator during that time. The Clifton test is binding 
law in Texas and has been influential elsewhere, even where it has not 
been formally adopted.39 
At the center of most paying quantities suits are disputes over the
amounts and proper classification of lease revenues and expenses. That is, 
there are fights over whether the lessee survived the first prong of the
Clifton test by proving that the lease turned a profit. If lease revenues
exceed ordinary lease operating expenses, the lease is producing in paying 
quantities. Extraordinary expenses are left out of the calculation. Courts 
around the country have grappled with what costs count as ordinary and 
which as extraordinary, often with differing results.40 
38. For criticism of the usual “objective” label, see Kramer, supra note 1, § 
15.03, n.61: “A number of authorities label the two major tests the objective and 
subjective tests. I prefer to label the test which relies on computations as
mathematical, and reserve the terms objective and subjective to describe whether
or not a reasonable person or good faith analysis is applied.”
39. State courts in Alaska, California, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan,
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia have all cited to Clifton, as have the Fourth,
Fifth, Eight, and Tenth federal circuits. 
40. 3 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 2, § 604.6(b). See also Patrick S.
Ottinger, Production in "Paying Quantities"-A Fresh Look, 65 LA. L. REV. 635, 
643–44 (2005): 
[I]t is helpful at the outset to identify the contrary interests of the lessor
and of the lessee in disputes over whether a lease is generating 
production in “paying quantities.” The lessor would want to consider as 
many items of cost as possible so as to require a greater amount of 
production before it could be said that current operating costs were being 
met. Obviously, the lessor is well served to “load it up.” Conversely,
from the point of view of the lessee, and so as to permit a smaller amount 
of production to satisfy the requirement of being in “paying quantities,” 
it is necessary that fewer items of expense be considered. . . . Clearly, the
lessee will challenge certain expenses as not being lifting costs, and, 
hence, will try to limit or minimize the relevant block of expenses to be 
measured against revenue. This tug of war is typically at the heart of a
production in a “paying quantities” case.
A few cases that have seen courts wrestle with the proper categorization of costs
include Lege v. Lea Expl. Co., 631 So. 2d 716 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
635 So. 2d 1112 (La. 1994), Pshigoda v. Texaco, Inc., 703 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Tex.
342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd  22 5/21/20  8:22 AM




   
   




   
 
   
   
 
    
 
 
    
   







   
  
   
 
   
  
   
  





    
   
    
376 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
To analyze either prong of the Clifton test, a court must first settle on
a period of time for review. If the lease provides a particular term, as the
lease in Ridenour v. Herrington did, there is little controversy because the 
parties have set the scope themselves, and their agreement will generally 
not be disturbed.41 But what should a court do when no period is
contractually specified? The Clifton court itself forbid an “arbitrary” 
limitation on the temporal scope of the analysis, stating:
There can be no arbitrary period for determining the question of 
whether or not a lease has terminated for the additional reason that 
there are various causes for slowing up of production, or a 
temporary cessation of production, which the courts have held to 
be justifiable . . . . We again emphasize that there can be no limit
as to time, whether it be days, weeks, or months, to be taken into 
consideration in determining the question of whether paying 
production from the lease has ceased.42 
This prohibition was in response to the lessor’s argument that the
determinative time period should be 60 days, in accordance with a 60-day 
operations clause in the lease at issue.43 Such clauses declare that a lease 
will automatically terminate within a set number of days after production 
ceases if the lessee does not engage in re-working operations. With an
operations clause, the lessee effectively has a fixed “grace period” within
which to prevent termination by re-working the well(s). That clause only 
had relevance, the Clifton court reasoned, if production in paying
quantities had already ceased. While rejecting any predetermined “limit”
on the analysis—be it days, weeks, or months —the court then went on to 
list “a reasonable period of time under the circumstances” as one of the
factors for the subjective prong of the test.44 Importantly, a reasonable
period of time is only treated as a factor for the latter prong of the analysis 
in the Clifton opinion. However, most courts and commentators have taken
App. 1986), writ refused NRE (May 28, 1986), and Pray v. Premier Petroleum, 
Inc., 233 Kan. 351, 357, 662 P.2d 255, 260 (Kan. 1983). 
41. The relevant provision in the lease at issue in that case stated:
The primary term of this lease shall be one year, and after the expiration 
of one year from the date hereof, paying production as that term is
interpreted by Texas law shall be necessary to perpetuate this lease.
Cessation of paying production after the primary term for a period of
sixty days shall cause this.
47 S.W.3d 117, 119 (Tex. App. 2001).
42. Clifton, 325 S.W.2d at 690.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 691.
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3772020] TIME PERIOD FOR A PAYING QUANTITIES ANALYSIS?
this second-prong factor to similarly set the temporal scope for both prongs
of the modern paying quantities test.45 This includes jurisdictions that have
not adopted the Clifton test.46 
Because it establishes the boundaries of the first and second prong of
the Clifton test, the time period is often outcome-determinative for the 
entire paying quantities question. If a lease has operated at a net loss for
twelve months, but at a net gain when one considers the twenty-four
months preceding or subsequent to that period, has it been profitable for a 
reasonable period of time? If the twelve months is a reasonable period of
time under the circumstances, the lessee has failed the first prong of the 
test; in states following the Clifton formulation, the lessee is then forced 
into the subjective test, where its behavior is more closely scrutinized and
it risks being punished for improvident business decisions. In states like
Louisiana, the lessee will automatically lose the lease for failure to obtain 
a profit over that timeframe.47 Despite its importance, courts often give the
selection of the time period only cursory attention.48 The majority of
paying quantities appellate opinions are unhelpful, either remaining totally 
silent on the issue or repeating well-worn bromides: the period must be
reasonable, it must not be unreasonably short, and the like. Unsurprisingly, 
this has resulted in a variety of time periods being used, often in factually-
similar disputes. As one scholar has put it: “[t]he accounting period 
applied varies significantly from case to case and is almost impossible to
predict.”49 
45. For just a small sample, see the following cases and articles: Pshigoda v.
Texaco, Inc. 703 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Tex. App. 1986) (“Koontz states that the court
is to determine profitability over a “reasonable period of time under the
circumstances”); Fleck v. Missouri River Royalty Corp., 2015 ND 287, 872 
N.W.2d 329, 335 (2015) (“A court must consider whether the well yielded a profit 
over operating costs over a reasonable period of time . . . .”); Steffey v. Steffey, 
No. 2012-CA-001354-MR, 2013 WL 4400728, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 16,
2013) (“Where the original term of a lease expired and no wells are producing in
paying quantities, the lease “will ipso facto terminate whenever production or 
development ceases for an unreasonable period of time” pursuant to the 
“thereafter” clause.”); Kramer, supra note 1, at 15-1, § 15.01 (“Most of the courts 
apply a ‘reasonable period of time’ approach to ascertain the appropriate
accounting period.”).
46. Such as Kansas (Texaco, Inc. v. Fox, 228 Kan. 589, 593 (Kan. 1980)),
Ohio (Paulus v. Beck Energy Corp., 94 N.E.3d 73, 94 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017)), and
Louisiana (Wood v. Axis Energy Corp., 899 So. 2d 138, 146 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 
2005)), among others.
47. See discussion infra Part II.
48. See supra source and text accompanying note 5.
49. Ritchie, supra note 7, at 997.
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Most states have added distinctions between temporary and prolonged
gaps in production.50 In these jurisdictions, a temporary cessation of
production will not result in the termination of the lease.51 This theory is
typically invoked in disputes regarding total gaps in production caused by
breakdowns in equipment, reworking operations, or mechanical repairs.52 
Sometimes these “temporary” periods are rather long: for example, the 
Arkansas Supreme Court held a four-year gap in production to be 
temporary in Saulsberry v. Siegel.53 Further, “production” is widely 
understood in this context to refer to production in paying quantities.54 But 
most modern leases contain an operations clause, providing that leases that
fail to produce for short periods (usually 30, 60, or 90 days) automatically
terminate if there are no reworking operations within those time limits. 
The presence of such a clause in a lease will typically moot the temporary
cessation problem. The Clifton opinion emphatically separated the effect
of the operations clause from the wider paying quantities analysis. For
those leases lacking an operations clause, there appears to be an unsettled 
question as to whether the analysis for determining whether a gap in
production is temporary is methodologically identical to the analysis for
determining the appropriate time period for a paying quantities analysis. 
The temporary cessation issue will be discussed herein only to the extent 
there is clear crossover. 
II. STATE-BY-STATE REVIEW 
A. Louisiana
Louisiana courts have examined periods ranging from eight months to 
four years.55 The state has always included a profitability requirement for
the paying quantities test.56 However, for many years the law also
50. See generally Kramer, supra note 17.
51. See, e.g., Midwest Oil Corp. v. Winsauer, 159 Tex. 560, 563, 323 S.W.2d 
944, 946 (Tex. 1959) (holding that a clause allowing for lease survival despite
temporary interruptions in production is “necessarily implied” in a mineral lease).
52. 3 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 2, 604.4.
53. 221 Ark. 152, 252 S.W.2d 834 (Ark. 1952).
54. See Mohan Kelkar, The Effect of the Cessation of Production Clause
During the Secondary Term of an Oil and Gas Lease, 22 TULSA L.J. 531 (1987).
55. In Brown v. Sugar Creek Syndicate, 195 La. 865 (La. 1940), the 
Louisiana Supreme Court discussed the 8-month period from February to October
of 1937. The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal reviewed a trial court 
paying quantities determination over a four-year period in Lege v. Lea Expl. Co., 
Inc. 631 So. 2d 716 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1994). 
56. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Alton Oil Co., 161 La. 139, 142 (La. 1926).
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3792020] TIME PERIOD FOR A PAYING QUANTITIES ANALYSIS?
demanded that the amount of royalties paid to the lessor constitute “serious 
consideration” when compared to amounts of bonus, delay rentals, or shut-
in payments.57 The Louisiana Mineral Code, adopted in 1975, eliminated 
the serious consideration requirement.58 Instead, the royalty amounts may 
now only be considered as an evidentiary signal of the reasonableness of
the lessee’s expectations.59 But Louisiana remains unique in that it appears
to be the only jurisdiction where leases producing at a profit are not 
necessarily producing in paying quantities. For instance, in Edmundson 
Bros. Partnership v. Montex Drilling Co.,60 Louisiana’s Third Circuit
Court of Appeal stated: “[The defendant’s expert] opined that the lease
produced a profit of $139.00 per month for the 18-month period preceding 
the filing of suit. The trial judge found, and we agree, that this amount is 
not sufficient to ‘induce a reasonably prudent operator to continue
production.’”61 In this case, as in most discussed herein, there was no
explanation of what made the eighteen months preceding the filing of suit
an appropriate time frame. 
Louisiana’s Second Circuit Court of Appeal overturned a lower 
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a group of lessors in 
Middleton v. EP Energy E & P Co., L.P.62 In their summary judgment
pleadings, the lessors argued that their former lease expired in August of 
1992, after 12 months of acute operating losses for a marginal natural gas 
well allegedly holding the lease. However, the lessors alternatively argued 
that even if a 41-month span was analyzed, the lease had expired at the
end of 1994. The district court focused on the longer period instead of the 
shorter one, without explanation, and ruled in favor of the lessors. The 
57. Id.; Noel Estate, Inc. v. Murray, 65 So. 2d 886 (La. 1953); LA. REV. STAT.
§§ 31:124–31:125, and Comments thereto.
58. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 31:124–31:125; according to the Comments to articles 
124 and 125, the consideration test was never a true legal requirement and never
functioned as more than an evidentiary signal. This claim is dubious, based on the
caselaw referenced above—it appears Louisiana courts before the Mineral Code
simply inconsistently applied it as a requirement.
59. Id.
60. 731 So. 2d 1049 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1999).
61. Id. at 1058.
62. Middleton v. EP Energy E & P Co., L.P 188 So. 3d 263 (La. Ct. App. 2d 
Cir.)., writ denied sub nom. Middleton v. EP Energy E & P Co., L.F., 192 So. 3d
773 (La.), and writ denied, 192 So. 3d 774 (La. 2016). The matter was remanded
to the trial court because the Second Circuit believed there was a fact dispute over
whether sales of certain gas by-products had been included in the plaintiffs’
analysis showing a net loss. In full disclosure, the author represents the plaintiffs-
lessors in this case. The matter is ongoing, so critical analysis is limited in this
summary.
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380 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
appellate court reversed, stating that the defendants’ calculations arguably
revealed a slight net profit over the forty-one months. However, in doing
so, the court rejected one of defendants’ key arguments: that the lower
court was required to examine production after the disputed period and 
consider the well’s return to profitability over the 17 years following 
1994.63 The court pointed out that the termination of a lease for a failure
to produce in paying quantities occurs, if at all, automatically.64 As a result,
production after the date of alleged termination is irrelevant to whether it 
was maintained up to that point and lessors are entitled to bring suit many
years after this date.65 
In Gloria’s Ranch v. Tauren Expl., Inc., the Louisiana Second Circuit 
Court of Appeal noted that other courts in the state generally use a 12–18
month period in evaluating the sufficiency of production.66 Since then, the
matter has twice been taken up by the Louisiana Supreme Court, but the
finding that the lease at issue expired for failure to produce in paying
quantities has not been disturbed.67 Of particular interest for the purposes 
of this Article is the court’s seemingly-innocuous reference to the normal
12-to-18 month span en route to approving the trial court’s fixing of the 
proper time period at 18 months.68 With the time period set, the lower court
performed the mathematical prong of the test and found that the expenses 
far outstripped revenues. Under the Louisiana approach to the first prong,
that meant the lease automatically terminated. This termination occurred 
despite the fact that the operator/lessee purportedly had a development
63. Middleton, 188 So. 3d at 265–66.
64. Id.
65. Id. The Middleton court noted that Louisiana’s third circuit had 
considered a period of allegedly-insufficient production from seven to ten years 
prior to trial in Lege v. Lea Expl. Co., Inc., 631 So. 2d 716 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.), 
writ denied, 635 So. 2d 1112 (La. 1994). 
66. Gloria’s Ranch, L.L.C. v. Tauren Expl., Inc., 223 So. 3d 1202, (La. Ct. 
App. 2d Cir. 2017), reh’g denied (Aug. 7, 2017), writ granted, 231 So. 3d 639
(La. 2017), writ granted, 231 So. 3d 640 (La. 2017), writ granted, 231 So. 3d 642 
(La. 2017), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 252 So. 3d 431 (La. 2018), reh’g granted 
in part, 251 So. 3d 392 (La. 2018). For an in-depth discussion of the appellate
disposition of this case, see Andrew D. Martin, Mineral Code Article 206 Liability
After Gloria’s Ranch: Rights, Remedies, Revolution, 6 LSU J. ENERGY L. &
RESOURCES 377, 405–06 (2018).
67. Gloria’s Ranch, L.L.C. v. Tauren Expl., Inc., 252 So. 3d 431, 446 reh’g 
granted in part, 251 So. 3d 392 (La. 2018).
68. Gloria’s Ranch, L.L.C. v. Tauren Expl., Inc., 223 So. 3d 1202, 1211 (La.
Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2017).
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3812020] TIME PERIOD FOR A PAYING QUANTITIES ANALYSIS?
plan in place that would soon result in much greater production.69 So the
court in Gloria Ranch took the mathematical prong seriously—there was
not enough production to contemporaneously hold the lease, regardless of
how reasonable the lessee’s actions may have been. The lessee could not
“pass go” into the second prong because it did not show a profit.
B. Oklahoma
Oklahoma is different. As noted, it is the only state that has openly 
rejected the simple fee determinable classification for the mineral lease
and, thus, the notion of automatic termination. The opinion in Stewart v. 
Amerada Hess Corp. illustrates some of the important ways the state
diverges from the mainstream approach.70 At the forefront of that decision
was whether the depreciation of equipment used in lifting operations 
should be regarded as an operating expense. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court ruled that it should.71 But that conclusion led that court to reverse 
the trial court’s determination that the lease at issue failed to produce in
paying quantities.72 The trial court had arrived at that ruling by performing
the mechanical test over a two-year span and finding a net operating loss.73 
The propriety of that duration was not disputed, and it appears that the
Oklahoma Supreme Court tacitly affirmed its use. But because the trial
court failed to include the depreciation costs in its analysis, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court decided that “neither party had the opportunity to adduce
proof of circumstances surrounding the stoppage of profitable production 
nor those factors which might afford compelling equitable considerations 
either in favor of or against lease cancellation.”74 The absence of
production itself could not result in the termination of the lease. Instead,
the question was whether that cessation extended “for a period longer than 
reasonable or justifiable in light of all the circumstances involved.”75 
Two years later, the same court extended this logic in Barby v. 
Singer.76 There, the trial court analyzed a 14-month period—from
February of 1978 to April 18, 1979—with the latter date being the day on 
69. Specifically, Tauren had sought out—and eventually found—a partner 
with the capital necessary to drill the more expensive horizontal wells necessary 
to exploit the Haynesville Shale formation. Id. at 1212–13.
70. 604 P.2d 854 (Okla. 1979).
71. Id. at 857–858.
72. Id. at 857.
73. Id. at 856. 
74. Id. at 858.
75. Id.
76. 648 P.2d 14 (Okla. 1982).
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382 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
which suit was filed.77 That court ordered the lease cancelled if the lessee
did not drill a new well within 90 days.78 The lessors appealed directly to 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court, who assigned the case to Division No. 2 of 
the Oklahoma Court of Appeals.79 The appellate court ruled that the lease 
had terminated for failure to produce in paying quantities and remanded to
the trial court for an order to that effect.80 The lessees then applied for a
writ of certiorari to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.81 That court affirmed 
the reasonableness of the trial court’s 14-month period.82 It also made a
cursory refence to the mechanical prong of the Clifton calculus, stating
that “the real issue is whether a well yields production income in excess 
of the cost of the production.”83 But the court then turned the objective test
inside out by turning its attention to “compelling equitable 
circumstances;” the United States Congress was considering the Natural
Gas Policy Act during the 1978–1979 period.84 If it passed, this legislation
had the potential to increase the price of natural gas.85 In light of this
possibility, the Supreme Court stated: 
The issue thus presented is whether that prospect, as remote and
uncertain as it was, saved the lease from termination during a
period when profitability was marginal or even when the lease
operated at a loss. As we have heretofore pointed out, the failure
of the lease to produce a profit does not in and of itself terminate
the lease. Compelling equitable considerations may rescue the
lease from termination even when well operations are
unprofitable.86 
The reference to compelling equitable circumstances spoils any suspense
here; the Act passed, the court applied the increased gas prices
retroactively, and the lease survived the putatively-mechanical test
unscathed.87 





82. Id. The court borrowed the line that the proper time period is “not 
measured in days, weeks or months” originally found in Clifton, but did not
actually cite to that case. 
83. Id. at 17–18.
84. Id. at 17.
85. Id. at 17. 
86. Id.
87. Id. at 18.
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3832020] TIME PERIOD FOR A PAYING QUANTITIES ANALYSIS?
In the 1991 decision of Fisher v. Grace Petroleum Corp.,88 Division 
No. 3 of the Oklahoma Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court ruling that
a lease failed to produce in paying quantities after sustaining operating
losses for twelve consecutive months. The lessee protested that the lease
would have shown a profit if the trial court had considered one additional
month.89 The lessee additionally argued that the appropriate time span was
the entire history of the well.90 The appellate court found no error in the
trial court’s choice, noting that the excluded thirteenth month was the
month following a demand for release from the lessors.91 The court
stressed that bounding the time period in this manner was reasonable in 
this particular case, apparently leaving open the possibility that other
cases—with different but unspecified facts—might justify consideration
of post-demand revenues.92 Importantly, the Fisher court also took the
position that the termination occurred automatically, regardless of the fact
that the lessee voluntarily shut in the well at different points during the 12-
month period.93 It posited that the “compelling equitable circumstances,” 
invoked in Stewart and Barby, could only be relevant if a lease lacked an
operations clause.94 Because the Fisher lease contained such a clause,
which modified the habendum clause, there was no need to insert an
equitable “temporary cessation” period.95 The mere capability of the lease 
to produce in paying quantities was not enough to save it from automatic
termination.
Just three years later, the Oklahoma Supreme Court moved away from
the Fisher ruling in Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals.96 In that case, the court
reaffirmed the principle that Oklahoma considers “production” in a 
mineral lease to mean only the capability of production in paying 
quantities.97 Thus, the objective test is always incomplete without
evidence regarding the lease’s capacity to produce in paying quantities, 
regardless of whether any marketing actually takes place and regardless of
the existence of an operations clause. The mere capacity of a lease to
88. 830 P.2d 1380 (Okla. Civ. App. 1991).
89. Id. at 1385–86.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1386. A demand for a “release” in this context is a request that the
lessee recognize that the lease has terminated. See Chesapeake Operating, Inc. v. 
Richardson, 884 So. 2d 1263, 1264 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2004).
92. Fisher, 830 P.2d at 1386. 
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1387.
95. Id.
96. 869 P.2d 323 (Okla. 1994).
97. Id. at 326.
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384 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
produce in paying quantities was enough to save it from automatic
termination. That this ruling abrogated Fisher was confirmed by the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court in Hall v. Galmor.98 In that litigation, the lessor 
argued that the Pack rule meant that “a well capable of producing in paying 
quantities can sit without any actual production for an indefinite period of
time, thus rendering the bargained-for cessation of production time 
restraints null.”99 That is, since “production” is required to continue the
lease, the cessation of actual production for periods longer than the 60 or 
90 days identified in the operations clause should entail automatic
termination. The court dismissed this concern by pointing out that the 
lessor had other mechanisms to induce a lessee to sell production, such as 
making a demand for the lessee to comply with the implied covenant to
market.100 
C. Ohio
Ohio has not fully embraced the Clifton test. The Ohio Supreme Court
articulated a profit-alone test in Blausey v. Stein.101 In Blausey, a small
operator performed his own labor on a marginally-productive well. 
Though revenue was low, well costs were even lower; the lessor could 
only show an operating loss if the calculated value of the operator’s labor 
was included.102 The court ruled that the operator’s efforts to keep costs
down should inure to his benefit.103 Thus, it excluded those labor costs,
found a slight profit, and declared the well to be producing in paying 
quantities.104 The court looked at a six-year period but did not explain why 
that period was appropriate.105 
More recently, the Ohio Seventh District (Harrison County) Court of
Appeals dealt with the temporary cessation problem in Dennison Bridge,
Inc. v. Resource Energy, LLC.106 There, the court drew on Ohio and national
jurisprudence to determine that there is no fixed two-year threshold which 
automatically renders a longer cessation “unreasonable.”107 Instead, the
98. 427 P.3d 1052, as corrected (July 16, 2018), reh’g denied (Sept. 10,
2018). 
99. Id. at 1068–69.
100. Id.
101. 61 Ohio St. 2d 264 (Ohio 1980).
102. Id. at 266.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 266–67.
105. Id. at 265.
106. 50 N.E.3d 242 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015).
107. Id. at 249.
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3852020] TIME PERIOD FOR A PAYING QUANTITIES ANALYSIS?
reasonableness of the length of the cessation is a question of fact, which can
only be decided on summary judgment in rare cases: those in which
reasonable minds could not disagree, based on the fact record.108 The 
appellate court saw several open fact questions that made summary
judgment inappropriate and, therefore, reversed the lower court.109 
A year later, the Seventh District (Monroe County) Court of Appeals
decided Lang v. Weiss Drilling Co.110 The operator in that case endured 
multiple extended periods of operational losses, including the five years
between 2003 and 2007. The trial court ruled that the lease failed to
produce in paying quantities and the appellate court affirmed. While 
acknowledging that the lessee has discretion in determining profitability,
the court noted the defendant made no assertions of profitability for the
2003 to 2007 period. The defendant did claim that a broken pump 
explained the lack of profit in 2005 and 2006 and urged the courts to look
at a “longer period of time to allow for fluctuation.” But the appellate court
adhered to the automatic termination conception, stating: “[A]ny evidence 
that the Well has been profitable from 2008 to present would be irrelevant 
because the Lease would have terminated prior to 2008 due to lack of 
production.”111 
Thus, termination is something the court fixed at a particular point in
time, such that later profit has no effect; the horizon of the inquiry was
limited by the end of the five year period of non-profitability, which the 
court implicitly determined was a reasonable period to adjudge the 
sufficiency of production.112 However, the court did not offer any 
explanation of why this particular period was long enough in its paying 
quantities discussion. It did note, in affirming the trial court’s refusal to 
apply the temporary cessation of production doctrine, that courts have 
typically looked to periods of two years or less in determining the
reasonableness of a cessation. Again, it is worthwhile to ask how much
these inquiries overlap.
The same court spoke more directly to the time period for a paying
quantities analysis the following year in Paulus v. Beck Energy 
Corporation.113 There, the court conceded that the Blausey opinion did not
import the second step of the Clifton analysis into Ohio law, but claimed
that a paying quantities analysis “still involves various equivalent [good 
faith] considerations in determining a reasonable base period for the 
108. Id. at 251.
109. Id.
110. 70 N.E.3d 625 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016).
111. Id. at 632.
112. Id. at 629–30.
113. 94 N.E.3d 73 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017).
342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd  32 5/21/20  8:22 AM
     
 
 
    
    
  
 
    
    
   
 
 








   
  
 












 114. Id. at 91–92. 
 115. Id. at 95–96. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 96. 
 118. 553 P.2d 885, 890 (Kan. 1976). 
 
386 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
equation in a particular case.”114 In Paulus, unlike Blausey, the
reasonableness of the period for the profit test was contested: the lessors
showed no profit for a three-year period from 2012 through 2014, while
the lessee countered that the seven years from 2007 to 2014 resulted in a
profit.115 The appellate court noted that the trial court was the factfinder
whose job was to determine the reasonableness of the base period to be
used. But that recognition did not prevent the court from engaging in a 
detailed review of the trial court’s determination. The opinion sketched
out an overall downward trend in profitability—the lessee’s longer period 
allowed earlier profits to offset later losses.116 It also pointed to the fact
that the lease was still in its primary term during two of the earlier years
offered by the lessee. The court did not explicitly state that primary term
profitability could not be included in the calculation; instead, it declared:
Considering the totality of the particular circumstances existing in
this case, a trier of fact could reasonably begin the time period for
the paying quantities equation with 2010, when the lease entered
its secondary term. Using the five-year period of 2010-2014 
would render a loss of $551.51 . . . . [T]he trial court’s judgment
finding the lease terminated due to a lack of paying quantities is 
upheld.117 
Though the Paulus opinion delves much deeper into the time period 
question than many others discussed herein, it leaves open several
essential questions, including the significance of the primary term
production amounts. Does the opinion imply that profitability (or a lack
thereof) during the primary term is never relevant to the paying quantities
analysis? Or was it only “reasonable” of the trial court to exclude those 
years due to some specific feature of this fact scenario? Part IV discusses
this issue.
D. Kansas 
In Reese Enterprises, Inc. v. Lawson, the lessee obtained 125 barrels
of oil during an 18-month period.118 The lessee apparently took several
steps to keep costs down during this time frame and claimed that he was
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3872020] TIME PERIOD FOR A PAYING QUANTITIES ANALYSIS?
able to operate at a small profit.119 The trial court disagreed with the
lessee’s argument and declared that the lease terminated for a failure to 
produce in paying quantities.120 The lessor argued on appeal that, in 
addition to his efforts to keep costs down, he attempted to fruitfully 
develop the lease in other ways. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court ruling and such an affirmation is notable for its wholesale
rejection of the subjective test, despite a reference to Clifton. It stated: 
The question here presented does not relate to the steps reasonably
necessary to bring the lease into better production for the benefit 
of both the lessor and the lessee or to further develop the lease.
Rather, the question is whether the lease has expired by its own
terms.
[Under a subjective standard] the test actually becomes one of
determining what a reasonably prudent operator would do for the 
purpose of making a profit and not for purposes of speculation. In 
our opinion the better approach is to follow the innumerable cases
which apply an objective test, where the determination of ‘paying 
quantities’ turns upon a mathematical computation . . . . This
approach recognizes the interest of both the lessor and the lessee,
and it gives the lessor some protection when the burdens of the
lease far exceed the meager royalty payments, when they fall
below the customary delay rental.121 
The court then went through various costs, both actual and imputed, and 
confirmed that the lease failed to turn a profit. Almost as an afterthought,
the court noted that it was not fixing eighteen months as the only 
appropriate period and that “[t]he time factor in the formula heretofore 
discussed is a question we leave open.”122 
The Kansas Supreme Court revisited the paying quantities issue in 
Texaco v. Fox.123 At issue was the simultaneous maintenance of a mineral
reservation and a mineral lease, with the former requiring production in
“commercial quantities” after a primary term and the latter requiring 
merely “production.”124 The court found the terms to be synonymous, such 
that maintenance of either interest was sufficient for maintenance of the
119. Id. at 893.
120. Id. at 894.
121. Id. at 895–97 (internal citations omitted).
122. Id. at 899.
123. 228 Kan. 589 (Kan. 1980).
124. Id. at 590–91.
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388 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
other.125 In determining whether the reservation and lease were so 
maintained, the court employed the objective test as enunciated in Reese
v. Lawson.126 The trial court determined that production was not in paying 
quantities after examining Texaco’s annual accounting statements for each 
year of a thirteen-year time period.127 The Kansas Supreme Court rejected 
this method as unreasonable, stating: 
Regarding the thirteen-year period: it is generally accepted that
profitability on an oil and gas lease should be determined over a
relatively long period of time in order to expose the operation to 
the leveling influences of time. The arbitrary use of a short period 
of time while a well is down for a workover is obviously 
untenable. On the other hand, the use of an unreasonably long
period would entail using past glories during flush production to 
determine a lease’s present condition, which would give a
distorted result not reflective of the current status of the lease. The
better rule precludes the use of a rigid fixed term for determination
of profitability and uses a reasonable time depending upon the
circumstances of each case, taking into consideration sufficient 
time to reflect the current production status of the lease and thus
to “provide the information which a prudent operator would take
into account in whether to continue or to abandon the operation.” 
We find the thirteen-year accounting period was an unreasonably 
long period of time.128 
This formulation is both helpful and deceptive. On one hand, the court
provided guidance that is lacking in other major opinions by stating that
the ultimate goal of the fixing of an individual time period is to look to a
window that provides the information necessary to make a prudent 
operational decision provides. But the court did not explain what made
thirteen years inappropriate for such a window. Further, the court admitted
that its finding that this span was unreasonably long was dicta, since “any
combination of years will show production in paying quantities.”129 
125. Id. at 592.
126. Id. at 593–94.
127. Id. at 592–93.
128. Id. at 593 (citing to 2 KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS
§ 26.7(u) (1964) and Douglas Hale Gross, Annotation, Meaning of “Paying 
Quantities” in Oil and Gas Lease, 43 A.L.R. 3d 60–62 (1972)).
129. Id. at 594.
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3892020] TIME PERIOD FOR A PAYING QUANTITIES ANALYSIS?
The trial court in Buehler v. Angle130 determined that the lease in 
question was capable of producing in paying quantities and that a cessation
of production was temporary, rather than permanent. The temporary 
cessation in this case lasted from August of 2000 to December of 2001.
On appeal, the lessor argued that the trial court only used a 2-month period 
to determine daily oil production by looking at weekly lease reports from 
April and May of 2002.131 According to the lessor, a period that short is
per se unreasonable.132 But the appellate court stated that the lower court
had not confined itself to that span. Instead, the trial judge had considered 
a total of nine months; seven of these months preceded the temporary 
cessation and then the April and May of 2002 span following the
cessation.133 According to the appellate court, this period constituted a
“reasonable time period” under the circumstances of the case because
looking at evidence of production from late 2001 to 2002 would have 
“skewed” the average daily production; though it was being produced, oil
was not measurable prior to April of 2002 because it had not accumulated 
in sufficient quantities to spill into the stock tanks.134 
E. Texas
Texas is the home of the influential Clifton decision, but more recent 
cases are also relevant to the focus of this article. For instance, in Pshigoda 
v. Texaco, Inc., 135 the Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court’s
consideration of two distinct time frames. The trial court instructed the 
jury to make separate findings on profitability on (1) the twenty-three and
a half months preceding the filing of suit, from January 1, 1981 to 
December 12, 1982, and (2) the seventeen months between the filing of
suit and the beginning of trial, from December 12, 1982, to March 1,
1984.136 The jury determined that the lease was profitable over the earlier
period and unprofitable over the later period, but that a reasonable operator
would have continued operating under the circumstances despite the
losses.137 The appellate court approved of the trial court’s bifurcation,
stating: 





135. 703 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. App. 1986).
136. Id. at 419. 
137. Id.
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390 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
The first time period, encompassing the two years immediately
preceding the filing of the suit is sufficient to give a picture of
profitability over a reasonable length of time uninfluenced by the 
litigation. The second time period, slightly over a year and
encompassing the period when litigation was pending, is also long
enough to accurately reflect a profitability period and additionally 
provide a contrast with pre-suit performance.138 
Spreading the accounting period over two separate spans operated as one 
way around the equitable problem referenced earlier, wherein a lessee
might lose a lease by scaling back on operating costs while under siege 
from its lessor. But it is not clear that this was the only way around this 
dilemma, or the best one. If the jury was willing to give the lessee a pass
for the unprofitable second period, why would it not have done so if the
entire three-year time span were considered as one? Further, the two-term
approach is inconsistent with a literal reading of Clifton and its offspring, 
which reference a singular reasonable time period. 
In Dreher v. Cassidy Ltd. Partnership,139 the Eastland Court of
Appeals overturned a trial court’s summary judgment that a lease expired
for failing to produce in paying quantities. The lessor successfully showed
that the lease was not profitable for the eight months between September
of 1998 and April of 1999. But, according to the appellate court, the lessor 
“produced no evidence to show why the 8-month period was a reasonable
period of time.”140 As a result, the lessor failed to even meet the first prong
of the paying quantities test, much less established that a reasonably 
prudent operator would not have continued operations under those 
circumstances.141 Despite overturning the summary judgment at least
partially because the lessor had not established eight months as the proper 
period, the court in Dreher did not offer any explanation of how the lessor 
might have done that. Unfortunately, this silence is as predictable as it is
unhelpful. But it is notable that an appellate court overturned a trial court’s 
implicit determination that a particular time period was reasonable. The
reviewing court put the blame on the lessor for failing to put forth evidence 
on this point, which entails that the necessary evidence was not contained
anywhere in the summary judgment record. What sort of evidence would 
that be? Could the lessor have possibly met his summary judgment burden, 
at least as to the first prong of the test? 
138. Id.
139. 99 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. App. 2003).
140. Id. at 269. 
141. Id.
342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd  37 5/21/20  8:22 AM





    
  
  
      
  
   
     
      









   
 
 









     
    
    
   
    
   
3912020] TIME PERIOD FOR A PAYING QUANTITIES ANALYSIS?
The lease at issue in EnerQuest Oil & Gas, LLC v. Plains Exploration 
& Production Co. featured a voluntary shut-in clause which allowed the 
lessee to cease producing for a period, provided the lessee paid shut-in 
royalties to the lessor and the lease was capable of producing in paying 
quantities.142 The parties disputed, among other things, whether the
purportedly shut-in well at issue was capable of producing in paying 
quantities.143 The court noted that such capability required that the lessee
have a reasonable basis for the expectation of profitable returns.144 
Importantly, the reasonableness of the expectation must be determined
based solely on the information available to the lessee at the end of the
primary term.145 But the court was unable to determine the answer to that
question based on the record before it because there was no evidence as to
what the appropriate window of time would be for a return to profitability,
and thus noted: 
[T]here is still a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
EnerQuest would have recouped its operating and marketing costs 
within a “reasonable” period of time. At a rate of $27,000 every
six months, EnerQuest would have recouped the cost of the
pipeline hookup in approximately two years. But is this a
“reasonable” period of time? The court has no way of making that 
determination, because the Parties have presented no evidence as
to what is a reasonable amount of time over which to recoup 
operating and marketing costs. Perhaps it is common for oil and 
gas companies not to recoup the cost of a pipeline hookup for five 
years. On the other hand, it may be that in the oil and gas industry 
there is consensus that a “reasonable” period of time to recoup 
such costs is, for example, a year or less. The court simply cannot
interpose its own view one way or the other without an adequate
and credible foundation upon which to determine what constitutes
a “reasonable” period of time.146 
The court’s reasoning here mirrors the Dreher opinion, to which it cited.147 
It is interesting to note the court’s apparent belief that the typical industry
expectations for recouping costs are relevant to determining what span is
“reasonable.”
142. 981 F. Supp. 2d 575, 582 (W.D. Tex. 2013).
143. Id. at 583.
144. Id. at 594.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 596–97.
147. Id. at 597.
342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd  38 5/21/20  8:22 AM





   
    


















   








   
 
   
    
   
  
  
392 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
Another recent Texas decision of interest is B.P. Production Co. v. 
Laddex, Ltd.148 There, a jury looked at a 15-month period from August 1,
2005, to October 31, 2006, and determined that the lease failed to produce
in paying quantities. The appellate court reversed, deciding that a jury 
charge on the paying quantities issue was improper. That charge contained
separate questions and instructions for each prong of the Clifton analysis 
and read, in pertinent part:
From August 1, 2005 to October 31, 2006, did the Mahler D-2 
Well fail to produce in paying quantities? 
You are instructed that where production is sufficient to yield a 
return in excess of operating and marketing costs over a
reasonable period of time, the well is producing in paying 
quantities even though drilling and equipment costs may never be
repaid and the undertaking as a whole may ultimately result in a
loss.
. . .
Do you find that, under all the relevant circumstances, a
reasonably prudent operator would not continue, for the purpose
of making a profit and not merely for speculation, to operate the
Mahler D-2 Well in the manner in which it was operated between
August 1, 2005 to October 31, 2006?
You are instructed that in deciding whether a prudent operator
would not continue, for profit and not merely for speculation, to 
operate the well in the manner in which it was operated, you must 
take into consideration all matters which would influence a 
reasonably prudent operator. Some of the factors are: . . . [Clifton
factors].149 
The appellate court held that this charge was erroneous because it limited 
the jury’s consideration to the particular 15-month span where production 
was weak and therefore prevented it from considering the fact that the well
subsequently returned to profitability.150 The appellate court therefore
148. 513 S.W.3d 476 (Tex. 2017).
149. Id. at 483.
150. The Amarillo Court of Appeals stated:
Because the undisputed evidence established that the Arrington lease had
resumed profitable production, the jury question, which isolated a
fifteen-month period that was not reflective of the true profitability of 
342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd  39 5/21/20  8:22 AM





   




   
     
 
 
    
  
   
 
  
     













    
   
   
    





    
       
   
3932020] TIME PERIOD FOR A PAYING QUANTITIES ANALYSIS?
ordered a remand for a new trial because the evidence would have
“allowed a reasonable jury to differ as to whether the lease produced in 
paying quantities when a reasonable period of time is considered,” but 
declined to determine what would be a reasonable period in the case.151 
The lessee, BP, argued to the Supreme Court that the appropriate
decision would have been a rendition in its favor, rather than a remand; 
according to BP, a “reasonable time period” would include at least the 27
months preceding the filing of suit, which would have encompassed 
several months before and after the slowdown of production.152 In contrast,
Laddex argued that the jury charge was proper in that it specifically
instructed the jury that the 15-month period must be adjudged a reasonable
one to necessitate an affirmative answer to the first question.153 Further,
Laddex pointed out that, as a fee simple determinable interest, the lease
would have automatically terminated following a reasonable period of
unprofitable production. That sort of automatic termination would moot 
consideration of subsequent profitability.154 
The Texas Supreme Court disagreed with both sides, ruling that the
jury could not be directed to any particular period of time in making its
determination.155 This conclusion was drawn from a hyper-literal
interpretation of the Clifton pronouncement that there could be “no limit 
as to time” in considering the sufficiency of production.156 According to 
the Laddex Court, any charge that specified a particular time span would 
“not permit the jury to appropriately discharge its fact-finding duties”
because it would unduly influence the jury and violate Clifton.157 This did
not mean that the parties were barred from focusing the court toward 
the lease, limited the jury’s consideration to a period of time that was not 
reasonable to assess whether the lease had ceased to produce in paying 
quantities.
BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Laddex, Ltd., 458 S.W.3d 683, 688 (Tex. App. 2015), aff’d,
513 S.W.3d 476 (Tex. 2017).
151. Id. at 689.
152. Prod. Co., 513 S.W.3d at 484.
153. Id.
154. Id.; see also Laddex, Ltd.’s Response to Petitioner’s Brief On the Merits,
BP America Prod. Co. v. Laddex, Ltd., (No. 15-0248), 2016 WL 5795604 (Tex.)
at *8: (stating “Texas law is clear: production occurring after a lease has
automatically terminated is immaterial to the question of whether the lease 
previously terminated because of a failure to produce in paying quantities.”)
(available on WestLaw).
155. Prod. Co., 513 S.W.3d at 486–87.
156. Id. at 486 (citing to Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.3d 684, 690 (Tex. 1959)).
157. Id.
342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd  40 5/21/20  8:22 AM




   
  
 
    
 
   
   





   
   
  
 
   
 
    
  
    
    
 
    
   
  
   
   
 
   
    
    
      
 
     
  
    
    
394 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
particular durations through argument and evidence—just that this 
focusing could not be reduced to the jury charge.158 
F. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania was one of the early incubators of paying quantities law
but saw very little judicial activity on the issue during the twentieth 
century.159 The shale explosion of the early 2000s changed that, with the
development of the Marcellus Shale sparking a renewal in lease
litigation.160 These new controversies forced a long-due reckoning in the
legal space between Young and the newer, more-forgiving offspring of
Clifton. It came in 2012 with T.W. Phillips v. Jedlicka.161 
In Jedlicka, both the lessor and the lessee staked their arguments on
Young. Phillips argued that the Young decision demanded consideration of
an operator’s good faith in every paying quantities analysis, while Jedlicka 
claimed that the precedent required an objective calculation of profits and
losses.162 The court agreed with Phillips. In doing so, it declared that even 
“setting a reasonable time period necessarily implicates the operator’s
good faith judgment.”163 The court stressed repeatedly that determining 
what counts as reasonable is a fact-specific question.164 But it declined to 
identify any of the specific sorts of facts that could affect that
determination. The court favorably cited to Texaco v. Fox for the 
proposition that profitability “should be determined over a relatively long
period of time” but did not explain what that length is “relative” to.165 The
majority opinion stressed the age of the lease (which was 80 years old at 
trial) and the fact that the one unprofitable year identified by the lessor was
40 years before trial.166 The concurrence also took issue with the lessor’s
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. The Marcellus is a large gas-bearing shale formation that lies beneath 
several eastern states, most notably Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia.
GEOLOGY.COM, https://geology.com/articles/marcellus-shale.shtml [https://per
ma.cc/EXF4-P337] (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).
161. 615 Pa. 199 (Pa. 2012).
162. Id. at 214–15.
163. Id. at 216.
164. For instance, the majority cited favorably to an Arkansas decision for the
proposition that the “appropriate period for determining profitability depends 
‘upon the facts of the particular case and the specific reasons production waned 
or ended.’” Id. at 223 (citing to Ross Expls., Inc. v. Freedom Energy, Inc., 340 
Ark. 74, 81, 8 S.W.3d 511, 516 (2000)).
165. Id. at 223.
166. Id. at 224.
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3952020] TIME PERIOD FOR A PAYING QUANTITIES ANALYSIS?
choice of an older time period, stating that “scouring the 80-year history
of a well and finding a 12-month period where expenses were greater than 
revenue is false accounting for lease purposes and cannot be rewarded.”167 
But neither the majority nor the concurrence explained the legal relevance 
of the identification of an older time period, nor what fact conditions might
have made one year more than “false accounting.” 
The dissent inveighed against the majority’s departure from Young
despite framing its ruling as consistent with the older decision.168 It noted 
that inserting a subjective, good-faith test into the objective prong—by 
requiring such an inquiry before even setting the time period for analysis— 
meant that the separately-stated good faith prong was fairly redundant.169 
This would seem to make the paying quantities analysis functionally
indistinguishable from the reasonably prudent operator analysis. But the 
most important part of the Jedlicka dissent, for this Article’s purposes, is
its recognition that the trial court did not make clear what was actually
considered as a reasonable time period under the circumstances at all. 
Instead, it looked at the one-year period offered by the lessor and ruled 
that the “evidence indicates that the lessees were operating the wells in
good faith” and therefore had produced in paying quantities.170 The 
majority implied that this was equivalent to making good faith a part of 
the time period selection, but it instead clearly indicates that the
accounting period question was simply irrelevant. By failing to remand so
that the trial court could fulfill its fact-finding function under the new 
“subjective good faith reasonable time period” test it constructed, the
majority did not appear to take its own test seriously.171 
167. Id. at 226 (Eakin, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 227–42 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 240–41.
170. Id. at 225.
171. As Justice Saylor stated in his dissent:
For one, the lease is silent as to the relevant time period to determine if the
lease is producing in “paying quantities,” and it is not clear from the trial 
court’s opinion what, if any, period it used to perform this analysis . . . .
The nature of the loss suffered by the lease in 1959 is also not apparent
from that decision.
Id. at 241–42.
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396 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
III. ANALYSIS
A. Reasonableness 
The paying quantities analysis is generally supposed to be made over 
a period of time that is “reasonable under the circumstances.” Even if some 
outside boundaries can be established—somewhere between the date of
leasing and the date of trial—what counts as “reasonable” for the actual
analysis is difficult because the case law does not make it clear how the 
term reasonable is meant to be applied in this context. 
To begin with, the legal dictate—that a fact finder is to determine
profitability or objective good faith over a reasonable period of time under 
the circumstances—is a standard, rather than a rule. A rule is a rigid
directive that commands the enforcing party to respond in a determinate 
way to a set of defined factual circumstances.172 On the other hand, a
standard is a requirement that refers directly to one of the overarching
objectives of the legal order (such as fairness or reasonableness) and its
application requires the decider to both “discover the facts of a particular 
situation and to assess them in terms of the purposes or social values
embodied in the standard.”173 In practice, legal commands often include
mixtures of rules and standards and can often have varying degrees of
“ruleness” or “standardness.”174 Both have drawbacks and benefits, with 
rules tending to reduce legal uncertainty and costs of decision-making, but
tending to increase the error costs because of their inelasticity.175 
Standards are cheaper to promulgate and more open to variable fact
scenarios but have less value in guiding behavior or predicting results.176 
Directing trial courts to determine the sufficiency of production over a
reasonable period of time under the circumstances, as the jurisprudence 
usually does, is the issuance of a archetypical standard; it contains a direct 
reference to a substantive objective of the law and lacks guidance for 
application. 
172. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687–88 (1976).
173. Id.
174. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557, 561–62 (1992); Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 645, 650 (1991); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 126–31 
(1961).
175. Kaplow, supra note 174; Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 91 (2000).
176. Id.
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3972020] TIME PERIOD FOR A PAYING QUANTITIES ANALYSIS?
Yet, the reasonable time period standard is different from other
reasonableness standards in important ways. In other legal and non-legal 
contexts, people are often attempting to discern the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of someone’s behavior.177 In the context of paying 
quantities, however, the question is not about any party’s behavior but 
about the time period itself—it is about setting a “reasonable” temporal 
frame for (a) performing a mechanical calculation, under the objective
prong, or (b) evaluating behavior, under the subjective prong.178 Even 
under the latter prong, the evaluation of behavior is distinct from the 
borders of that evaluation. This is why Jedlicka’s claim that “setting a
reasonable time period necessarily implicates the operator’s good faith 
judgment” is so immediately counterintuitive. The time period sets the
scope of the evaluation and therefore has to be analytically prior to that 
evaluation. As an illustration, imagine that an operator was holding a
marginal lease in bad faith for one year but then was replaced with new 
management that produced in good faith, though still at a loss, for the
following two years. The later good faith of the operator is relevant to 
setting the time period if and only if the temporal window is wide enough 
to encompass those next two years. Even if a court determined that the
only chronological boundaries are the inception of the lease and the
beginning of trial—the present-tense, Laddex-type interpretation of
Clifton—those are still boundaries that set evaluations of good faith, rather
than being dependent on those evaluations. 
Buttressed by his own empirical research, legal scholar Kevin Tobia 
has pointed out that ordinary evaluations of reasonableness tend to be
hybrid judgments; that is, they are a mix of (1) descriptive judgments of 
perceived statistically average or normal behavior; and (2) prescriptive
judgments of how parties should behave.179 People usually determine
reasonableness to be somewhere in between a perceived “is” and “ought.” 
As an example, Mr. Tobia’s sample estimated that people watch an
average of four hours of television a day but believed the ideal time to be 
177. For example, in tort law the relevant standard to avoid negligence liability
is that one must act as a “reasonable man under like circumstances,” See,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965). See, generally, David Zaring,
Rule By Reasonableness, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 525 (2011).
178. See discussion in Part I herein regarding the general applicability of the
“reasonable time period” standard to both the mechanical and subjective prongs
in all jurisdictions who have paying quantities jurisprudence, whether those
jurisdictions follow Clifton or not. 
179. Kevin P. Tobia, How People Judge What Is Reasonable, 70 ALA. L. REV.
293, 329 (2018).
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398 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
2.34 hours.180 The sample fixed the “reasonable” number of hours per day 
between those two numbers at 3.19.181 Similarly, the sample believed the
average contract offer was accepted in 14.68 days, that the ideal delay was 
10.52 days, and that a reasonable delay was 12.21 days.182 
What this kind of research demonstrates is that people, when ascribing
“reasonableness” in behavior-evaluative contexts, are playing a certain
type of language game, with broad rules governing how they use the
term.183 The playing of the game in this way requires implicit reference to 
beliefs regarding certain fact circumstances—how long people may take
to accept contracts, what consequences result from taking too long or too 
short to accept them, how those consequences are shared between the
parties, amongst other concerns. Individuals also share, to some degree or
another, certain normative commitments relating to the subject matters at
issue. Because people have at least minimally-shared beliefs about the
relevant facts and values, they can meaningfully talk about what is
“reasonable” behavior and why. So, in many contexts, people can and do 
make reasonableness ascriptions within a fairly narrow and predictable 
range. 
One likely reason the paying quantities reasonable time period 
question is so perplexing is that it is difficult to determine how it fits in
with the usual way people use the term “reasonable” in other contexts. For 
one thing, the subject matter of paying quantities disputes is foreign to 
most jury members and judges. There is thus usually a steep learning curve
for the factfinder in a paying quantities dispute. Confusion and 
inconsistency can follow, as the factfinder is simply not familiar enough 
with the terminology and concepts of oil and gas law to meaningfully 
identify the relevant facts and the relations between them. It is difficult for
people to determine what counts as “reasonable” in thoroughly exotic
circumstances. 
180. Id. at 359. 
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Mr. Tobia has noted, in correspondence with the author, that not all 
reasonableness ascriptions converge in the middle of the ideal and perceived 
average; in some circumstances, people have good reason to favor one end of the
spectrum or the other (for instance, in Mr. Tobia’s experiments the “reasonable” 
percentage of school students bullied hewed closely to the ideal). Further, there is
likely more variation in the legal conceptions of reasonableness than in the lay 
context. However, people’s expectations of how “reasonable” is used in more
familiar contexts will obviously shape or shade their application of that term in
the legal context. 
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3992020] TIME PERIOD FOR A PAYING QUANTITIES ANALYSIS?
Many other areas of law feature a similar learning curve. The bigger
problem for the paying quantities time period issue is that it is not obvious
how one would make the hybrid prescriptive-descriptive judgment
normally applicable to questions of reasonableness. What is the 
descriptive end of the evaluation supposed to be? Factfinders are surely
not fixing the descriptive prong based on what operators actually do in 
periods of low production; the paying quantities doctrine exists because
operators often do tolerate losing periods based on speculation. As
Williams & Meyers puts it: 
The basis of the majority position is not that the parties intended 
to require that the production be sufficient so that a prudent lessee
would continue to operate the lease. A prudent lessee, attuned to
economic realities, would often continue to operate a lease that
was not producing in paying quantities in the hope of increasing
production or of making a new discovery on the lease, or of seeing 
the value of the lease increase due to new explorations on adjacent
tracts.184 
Lessees rarely simply forfeit a lease sua sponte if the losses are mild, so 
the descriptive prong cannot simply be how often operators actually do 
abandon marginally-productive leases. Instead, it appears that factfinders
are implicitly being asked to fix the “descriptive” end of the equation on 
what a prudent operator who is not acting for speculative purposes only 
would do.185 Given that all continued operations during periods of
economic loss are premised on a hope that expenses fall or prices rise,
there is clearly some tolerable level of speculation, and so some threshold
where the lessee’s purposes are too speculative.186 This in turn implies that
the erstwhile descriptive end of the reasonableness judgment here is
actually premised on a prescriptive judgment: whether a given expectation
is impermissibly speculative. The typical process for determining 
reasonableness therefore appears largely inapplicable to the production in 
paying quantities time period inquiry.
184. 3 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 2, § 604.5.
185. Id. The authors state: “Rather, the basis of the majority rule is that the
parties to the lease intended that a lessee should not be permitted to hold a lease
after the expiration of the primary term for speculative purposes only.”
186. Ritchie, supra note 7, at 1009–10 (correctly pointing out that “speculation”
is a broad term and proposes a conceptual line between permissible and
impermissible speculation). Courts have been loath to clarify what speculation
means in this context. There is therefore a layered conceptual problem in paying
quantities analysis, where factfinders are given essentially no guidance on two 
central standards (speculation and reasonableness).
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400 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
Texaco v. Fox contains one of the clearer judicial articulations of the 
game a factfinder is being asked to play in fixing a reasonable time period: 
he is to pick a span long enough to “expose the operation to the leveling 
influences of time.”187 Further, the time period should be long enough to 
“provide the information which a prudent operator would take into account 
in whether to continue or abandon the operation.”188 A lay member of a
jury given this direction might well understand that this precludes fixing 
the analysis for an oil lease over a single month’s span, if sales occur on a 
monthly basis, because a single data point cannot be “leveled.” But a juror 
will likely have less confidence about whether “leveling” is more
appropriate over a one- or five-year time period. In questions involving, 
say, the reasonableness of accepting a contract after ten days, an ordinary 
factfinder will have some familiarity with the sort of game he is playing; 
he will consider how long he believes it normally takes people to accept a
contract, how long he thinks is optimal for accepting, and place
reasonableness somewhere between those points. On the other hand, he is
adrift without familiar points of reference on the accounting period
question. He is unlikely to be acquainted with any technical aspects of 
mineral operations. More importantly, he will not have any clear idea how 
long a prudent operator would wait to make a production decision, or how
far in the future counts as impermissible speculation in this context. What 
if the operator believes, in good faith and with objectively reasonable data, 
that the lease will turn a profit after five more years—is that too far-sighted 
to be “reasonable”? Courts have simply not done much work in 
communicating the object of the game, likely because it is not entirely 
clear to courts either. 
B. What Circumstances? 
So, what circumstances do courts look to when determining what
counts as a reasonable period to review in a paying quantities case?
Appellate courts show no qualms about reviewing the fact conditions 
around other components of the paying quantities question. For instance,
in the many accounting battles over whether wells were turning a profit 
for a specific interval, courts have often looked into the circumstances
187. Texaco, Inc. v. Fox, 228 Kan. 589, 593 (Kan. 1980). Looking at a longer
period of time “levels” any aberrational short periods of very high or very low 
production. The obvious problem with this notion is that “leveling” can occur over
shorter or longer periods of time; the factfinder still must determine what counts
as sufficient leveling. 
188. Id.
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4012020] TIME PERIOD FOR A PAYING QUANTITIES ANALYSIS?
determining the propriety of the fact findings.189 But in construing what
counts as a reasonable time period, the courts have been remarkably
reluctant to specify which circumstances a factfinder should look to in
adjudging the sufficiency of production. The easy answer is that the
determination must be made under all circumstances. This is unhelpful in
any practical sense because there are innumerable circumstances that are 
facially irrelevant to the inquiry; whether a stock tank is black or gray is a 
fact circumstance but is not one that could not plausibly affect the 
reasonability of a two-year analysis. The price of oil, on the other hand,
may be a relevant circumstance. Unfortunately, courts have not attempted 
to explicitly spell out whether and why it should or should not be. The
review of the case law in Part II, above, emphasizes just how deep the 
judicial agnosticism on the relevant “circumstances” runs. Those decisions
feature some of the most detailed discussions of the reasonable time period 
standard, but there are scant references to the particular facts that should 
matter. 
Reading between the lines, it seems that the circumstances being 
hinted at are just those implicating market conditions: the objective 
economic circumstances that shift the timeline for profitability for a given
lease.190 This means that in tight times—periods of low prices or high
operating costs—the proper period for a paying quantities analysis is a 
longer one.191 The influential Williams & Meyers treatise even proposes
basing the entire analysis on whether a lease would be profitable in a 
normal price environment:
189. For instance, see Mason v. Ladd Petroleum, 630 P.2d 1283 (Okla. 1981), 
where the Oklahoma Supreme Court engaged in a detailed review of whether 
district expenses, administrative overhead, depreciation of casing, and 
depreciation of line heater and separator could be counted as ordinary operating
expenses for the mechanical test. Similarly, see Lege v. Lea Expl. Co., 631 So. 2d 
716, 719 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 635 So. 2d 1112 (La. 1994), where
the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal conducted a thorough examination
of whether the cost of converting a well to a saltwater disposal system should be
counted. 
190. See Simpson, supra note 8, at 374–75 (2017): “Within [the timeframe
selected] are the facts and circumstances that impact profitability . . . a reasonably 
prudent operator considers market conditions when deciding how to operate a
well--after all, lessees drill oil and gas wells to make money and profitability is 
largely dictated by market price.” 
191. Id.; See also Richard H. Bartlett, The Effect of Low Oil and Gas Prices
on Freehold Oil and Gas Leases: A Problem of Interpretation, 29 ALTA. L. REV.
1, 12 (1991): “A fall in prices is a factor to be considered in determining whether 
a reasonably prudent operator would continue to hold the lease. It will likely cause 
the termination of the lease if the fall is temporary and the loss is substantial.”
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402 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
The lessee has a fairly strong argument for holding the lease by
nonpaying production during a period when temporary depression 
prevents paying production. Clearly the lessee is not holding the 
land merely for speculative purposes, since under normal 
conditions the lease is presently producing in paying quantities. If
the lessor is receiving a financial benefit from production, and if
present production under normal conditions would be in paying
quantities, and if the lessee in good faith decides that he can better
himself financially in the long run from production at the present
rate, the better rule would seem to be to allow the lessee to
continue to hold the lease, despite a current loss due to depressed 
market conditions. Such a rule would not only avoid conflict with 
the policy against holding leases for purely speculative purposes, 
but in periods of sharp depression in the oil and gas industry, it
would provide essential relief to all operators.192 
Note that the Williams & Meyers conception differs slightly from the 
Clifton picture: for the editors of the treatise, a lease is not producing in 
“paying quantities” if it is producing at a loss, but should still be held
effective if it could produce at a profit under normal conditions. Under 
Clifton, on the other hand, a lease that operates at a loss may, in some 
cases, be producing in paying quantities. The editors of the treatise note 
that other writers have expressed doubts as to the coherence of a “normal”
price environment because there is always a real prospect that prices never 
return to the pre-downturn levels.193 
At least one author has tried to more specifically tie particular fact 
circumstances to the reasonable time period question. Attorney Morgan L. 
Simpson has suggested that courts consider the price cycles of oil in 
determining a reasonable time period for marginally-productive oil
wells.194 Economists have identified a number of overlapping, predictable
swings in the price of oil. These include annual seasonal cycles, as well as
longer cycles of approximately two, ten, and twenty-seven years.195 By 
noting where in a given price cycle an unprofitable period of an oil lease
falls, and looking at the realistic prospects for a price bounce, courts can
192. 3 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 2, § 604.6(c).
193. Id. (citing to Bartlett, The Effect of Low Oil and Gas Prices on Freehold 
Oil and Gas Leases: A Problem of Interpretation, 29 ALTA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1991)). 
194. Mr. Simpson is presently an attorney at Baty Otto Coronado PC. While
at Washburn University School of Law, he authored Should We Cycle Onto A New 
Analysis: Establishing the Proper Accounting Period for the Paying Quantities 
Analysis, 56 WASHBURN L.J. 355 (2017).
195. Id. at 375–79.
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4032020] TIME PERIOD FOR A PAYING QUANTITIES ANALYSIS?
determine “whether there has been a sufficient amount of time for the
lessee to consider the market conditions and make an informed production 
decision.”196 
There appears to be less long-term certainty for natural gas price
cycles. The shale boom of the mid-2000s, following the innovations in 
fracking technology, dramatically altered domestic gas supply. This may
ultimately make relatively-lower market conditions the “new normal.”197 
This might result in a less volatile market over the extended term, with 
prices bouncing within a narrower range on a year-to-year basis. But the 
impact of the United States’ potential as an exporter of liquefied natural
gas, riding on technological and geopolitical changes, could alter this
trajectory as well.198 On the other hand, the annual seasonal swings of
natural gas prices are fairly well-known.199 Courts can and should take this
information into account when determining what counts as a more or less 
reasonable time period for a gas lease.
Although lessees are understandably concerned about “market 
conditions” vis a vis periods of decreased prices, those market
considerations might also cut in the other direction. For example, the costs
of drilling and operating certain types of wells have decreased as 
technology has improved.200 If periods of low prices should lengthen the
196. Id. at 380.
197. Some commenters see the current glut of natural gas as more-or-less 
permanent; because shale gas is both abundant and now relatively inexpensive to
capture and demand is unlikely to rise sufficiently to meet that oversupply, prices
will remain lower than before the shale boom. ENERGYDIALOGUES.COM:
SPEAKER Q&A SERIES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://energy-dialogues.com/blog/2017
/08/15/speaker-qa-series-greg-vesey-managing-director-ceo-lng-limited [https://
perma.cc/B7J6-AYJX] (“It is not easy to see an end to this cycle, but more likely
we are experiencing a new normal. North America’s robust reserves create a
unique global opportunity to manage price volatility.”).
198. On the LNG revolution, see SUSAN L. SAKMAR, ENERGY FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS
(LNG) (Edward Elgar Pub. (2013)).
199. Residential and commercial demand for gas rises during the winter, 
usually causing a spike in prices. See Natural Gas Explained, Factors Affecting 
Natural Gas Prices, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energy
explained/natural-gas/factors-affecting-natural-gas-prices.php [https://perma.cc/
S7NG-E8WP] (last visited Dec. 23, 2019).
200. For example, see a 2016 report from the Energy Information 
Administration: 
Over time, these costs have changed. For example, drilling and
completion cost indices . . . from 2006 to 2012 demonstrate the effect of 
rapid growth in drilling activity. Since then, reduced activity as well as
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404 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
appropriate time span for a paying quantities analysis, it seems natural that
decreases in operating costs, or increases in prices, should shorten it.
Another fact to consider in fixing a time period is the internal practices 
and policies of lessees. In Texaco v. Fox, the court rejected the notion that
the lessee’s accounting procedures should bear on the time period actually
employed by the court.201 Similarly, the Laddex appellate court did not
agree with the lessor that the lessee’s annual reviews of which wells should 
be plugged was relevant to the question.202 While both courts were correct
that these internal procedures should not be treated as determinative fact 
circumstances, they can serve as useful proxies. If one of the aims in 
setting a reasonable time period is giving the lessee sufficient time to make
an “informed production decision,” its own timelines for making financial
or operational decisions is one piece of evidence as to what amount of time
is sufficient.
Overall, the relevant fact circumstances in this inquiry are probably 
limited to those that impact price and costs. These can be varied,
depending on the particulars of the time and place. For instance, the 
impending possible passage of the Natural Gas Act in Barby v. Singer was
a relevant condition in fixing a time horizon for a paying quantities
analysis: it certainly gets at the reasonableness of a belief that a lease will
return to profitability within a foreseeable time span. However, even 
accurately identifying these circumstances cannot determine which time
period is “reasonable.” At best, such an identification provides a basis for
a relative fixing of such spans: a tougher price environment means a longer
period, a more forgiving environment a shorter one. There is still an 
embedded policy question of “longer than what?” That is, a factfinder still
improved drilling efficiency and tools used have reduced overall well
costs. Changes in cost rates and well parameters have affected plays 
differently in 2015, with recent savings ranging from 7% to 22% relative 
to 2014 costs.
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., TRENDS IN U.S. OIL AND NATURAL GAS UPSTREAM
COSTS 3 (2016), https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/drilling/pdf/upstream.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LX2U-C8DP]
201. Texaco, Inc. v. Fox, 228 Kan. 589, 593 (Kan. 1980) (“Although there is 
a general business custom of using fixed annual accounting periods for purposes
of determining profit and for tax purposes, there is no reason production of oil and 
gas in paying quantities should be determined in that manner.”).
202. From the Laddex brief cited earlier: “BP’s own team of engineers,
conducting their annual review of the D2, reached the same conclusion as the jury,
opining that the D2 was a ‘poor well,’ and should be plugged and abandoned 
because of its inability to produce profitably.” Laddex, Ltd.’s Response to
Petitioner’s Brief On the Merits, BP America Prod. Co., v. Laddex, Ltd., (No. 15-
0248), 2016 WL 5795604 (Tex.) at *7. 
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4052020] TIME PERIOD FOR A PAYING QUANTITIES ANALYSIS?
must decide how to set a normal window before they can observe how the
particular fact circumstances stretch or constrict that window; and that is 
an issue that cannot be resolved simply by analyzing past decisions, as 
there is no stable conception of such a normal window even within any 
state. It is an open policy choice. 
IV. DEVELOPMENT
Some of the confusion regarding the paying quantities time period 
question is endemic and insoluble: it is a “reasonableness” standard that
lacks any apparent descriptive point of reference. The combination of this 
problem and the judicial reluctance to specifically identify the relevant 
factual circumstances that should go into determining the appropriateness
of an accounting span has resulted in unpredictable outcomes to paying 
quantities disputes. This Part examines a well-crafted proposal that 
attempts to get around the unpredictability and wasted costs caused at least
partially by the reasonable time period standard, by reforming the Clifton
test. While this proposal accurately identifies some of the problems with
certain aspects of the paying quantities test, it does not successfully avoid 
the time period issue. As a result, the reasonable time period standard must 
be given greater sense regardless of whether a jurisdiction employs a 
subjective, objective, or two-prong test. However, to facilitate this 
development trial and appellate courts must focus more explicitly on their 
decision-making processes in identifying what counts as a reasonable time
period. Courts also must recognize and embrace the reality that such an 
identification is, to at least some degree, an exercise in rulemaking. 
A. The Necessity of the Reasonable Time Period Standard
Professor Alex Ritchie argues that the two-prong test should be 
downsized.203 According to him, the mathematical prong is either vestigial
or harmful; it no longer serves any beneficial function and should thus be 
amputated.204 The first prong is the putatively mechanical one, but there is 
hardly anything mechanical about a cost/revenue calculation without a 
time period.205 Absent almost any guidance, factfinders are expected to 
203. Ritchie, supra note 7, at 977. Professor Ritchie is presently the Executive
Director of the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation and an adjunct faculty
member at the University of Colorado Law School.
204. Id. at 981.
205. Id. at 996 (stating “[T]he mathematical first prong of the Koontz paying 
quantities analysis is inherently elusive. Commentators and courts often label this 
first prong as the ‘objective’ prong and wrongly label the second Koontz prong as
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406 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
conjure up an accounting span that is uniquely fixed to undefined 
“circumstances” and then to calculate profits and losses.206 It is no wonder,
then, that the results are all over the map.207 For Ritchie, this uncertainty 
needlessly duplicates costs and is therefore economically intolerable.208 
Further, it is unfair to lessees, who bear the real financial risks of lease
operations.209 Much of the problem can be traced directly to the absence
of a predictable accounting period.210 As an alternative to the usual two-
prong test, Ritchie suggests abandoning the mathematical prong entirely 
and making the standard only about the lessee’s good faith: whether the 
lessee is holding the lease for the purpose of making a profit and not
merely for speculation.211 
Judicial treatment of the reasonable time period standard in regard to 
the objective test is, at best, erratically applied and, at worst, meaningless. 
Recent decisions indicate that some jurisdictions retain only a perfunctory
nod towards any time limitation at all. If there are no temporal limits for 
the mechanical test (as suggested by Laddex), that test necessarily
encompasses the entire productive history of a lease. If courts must make
a determination of subjective good faith prior to setting the limits of an
objective test (as in Jedlicka), courts are, in reality, performing only a 
subjective good faith test. Several jurisdictions have already moved in the
direction Professor Ritchie suggests. The collapse of the condition-
covenant distinction, and concomitant rejection of the concept of
automatic termination, is less of a betrayal of the Clifton two-prong test 
and more of a natural realization of its inherently inconsistent foundations. 
However, eliminating the objective prong would not obviate the basic
problem—there still must be a span over which to evaluate the good faith
of the lessee or lessees. If a lessee is holding the lease for merely
speculative purposes for a 2-month portion of a distressed period, but
the subjective prong, but the mathematical prong arguably is the more
unpredictable and subjective prong.”). 
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1007. 
209. Id. at 984.
210. Mr. Ritchie states:
Of all of the risks in the calculation previously discussed, perhaps the
most troubling when the market turns south is the lack of a set accounting
period. Without a predictable period, a lessee cannot analyze if it should 
or should not hold on to a lease that begins to operate at a loss after a
price drop.
Id. at 1003.
211. Id. at 1007.
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4072020] TIME PERIOD FOR A PAYING QUANTITIES ANALYSIS?
thereafter obtains information that makes holding the lease reasonable
(perhaps regarding a newly-discovered producing formation, or
impending legislation, as in Barby), did the lease expire during the short
bad-faith span, or was that too abbreviated a period to count? This thought 
experiment could also spread across two lessees; if the first lessee was in 
bad faith for a short period and then assigned it to the second, who was in
good faith for a longer span, how wide should the temporal window be? 
Professor Ritchie suggests that eliminating the mechanical prong at least
increases predictability for the lessee by guaranteeing that the window
lasts exactly as long as the lessee remains in good faith about the future— 
i.e., as long as his view of the future prospects for profitability of the lease 
is not overly speculative. But a similar problem arises even from only a
forward-facing perspective: how far into the “foreseeable” future 
represents a permissible peek? Knowing that oil price swings are fairly
predictable, an oil lessee during a down period may reasonably believe 
that the lease will return to profitability by the next supercycle peak, in a 
decade. Is that too far in the future? 
Further, the forward-facing and backwards-facing inquiries are
substantively identical, even if framed differently: when looking 
backwards, one can be seen as asking whether the actual duration of 
unprofitability (or of impermissible speculation) would have been
unreasonable at the beginning of the period. The problem remains that 
someone must always fix a chronological horizon for an analysis, whether 
we are looking backwards or forwards. If the parties do not perform that
horizon-fixing in the lease contract, it is up to a court to make a policy 
decision.
Additionally, making the test a purely subjective one is unlikely to
reduce costs. In a Clifton state, the mechanical prong can provide the 
lessee with a cheap filter for claims that are unlikely to succeed at trial. If 
faced with a paying quantities claim for a lease that failed to produce a
profit over only a short period of time—e.g., six or seven months—the 
lessee has the ability to get the claim dismissed through the summary
judgment procedure. The lessee would argue that the relevant
circumstances show that this time frame is not a reasonable one and that
the lease passes the objective test when examined over a longer period of 
time. The claim can then be dismissed. Similarly, a lessor in a state like
Louisiana or Kansas can prevail without the substantial expense of trial if 
the dry revenue or cost calculation shows an operating loss over a four- or 
five-year period. The difficulty in such cases is why the chosen time spans
are reasonable or unreasonable, a task that the next Part argues is not
intractable and can be made from a fairly removed, evidence-light 
position. A court can look at prior decisions and make a broad a priori
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408 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
determination of the reasonableness of a given period, subject only to 
minor individual tweaks. On the other hand, under a purely subjective test
there is little possibility of a pre-trial dismissal of a case because the
analysis requires the factfinder to look at every potentially relevant 
circumstance to determine whether the lessee had good motives. This is 
an evidence-intensive job, and thus one that greatly increases the cost of 
decision-making. Prior decisions will have reduced precedential value, 
since each demands a case-by-case evaluation of a lessee’s intentions. 
Though Professor Ritchie accurately notes many of the problems with
it, the mechanical test is worth keeping. Further, because the time period 
issue applies to either a subjective or objective test, it needs to be given 
greater sense regardless of whether or not the prong is eliminated. This 
development is jurisprudentially possible. It is also desirable, because the
broad reasonable time period standard is well-suited to the realities of oil 
and gas production. However, at present the paying quantities requirement
is substantively underdetermined and therefore is fairly unhelpful in 
predicting results of prescribing behavior. 
The mechanical prong is reflective of the basic structure of the mineral 
lease, especially the habendum clause. So is the concept of automatic
termination. Both should be understood as features of the convergence of 
intent of the original leasing parties: they wanted the lease relationship to 
continue for as long as it was mutually-rewarding and no longer than that.
What counts as “rewarding” might diverge at times for each party, and so
both parties bore certain risks due to the other’s incompatible incentives. 
The common ground, however, was at least profitable production, split at
the rate spelled out in their contract.212 When this stopped for a sufficient
period of time, the relationship was simply over without the requirement
of any additional formalities. Beyond that, the behavior of the parties was
constrained by express or implied covenants, with penalties for non-
compliance. But an involuntary or voluntary cessation of production for a
sufficient period of time did not require punishment; it simply meant the
end of the lease. What counts as a “sufficient period of time” is the difficult
part, but the idea that the lease termination is self-operative should not be. 
This understanding of contractual intent is to some degree both inferential
and artificial, but personal experience indicates that it is also a fair
understanding of how leasing parties actually think at the commencement 
of the relationship. Lessors, when asked, typically do not think that the 
lessee is entitled to stay on the property forever, regardless of how much 
212. See 3 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 2, § 601.4. See also discussion supra 
Part I.
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4092020] TIME PERIOD FOR A PAYING QUANTITIES ANALYSIS?
or little production is obtained from it.213 This expectation is reflected in 
the restrictive language of the standard habendum clause, which explicitly 
premises continuation of the lease on the objective fact of production. The 
consistent judicial enforcement of a “paying quantities” requirement even 
when that phrase is not explicitly used in the lease forms part of the
contractual expectations at the time of leasing. Crucially, the parties do not
bargain for the lease continuing “as long thereafter as the operator remains 
prudent.” It is about a good result, rather than good behavior or motives. 
There are few incentives to contractually fix the “reasonable period of
time” and so it rarely happens. When it does, as in Ridenour v. Herrington, 
the proper accounting period becomes a rule rather than a standard. 
Similarly, there are species of self-terminating mineral interests whose 
lifespans are fixed by statutory rule; for example, the mineral servitude in 
Louisiana has a firm ten-year clock that starts and stops when production 
or operations occur on the encumbered land. No state legislatures have not 
shown any interest in creating similar rules for mineral leases in the
secondary term. Nor have courts, instead opting only to adopt and apply
the reasonable time period standard. Leaving it to a standard is the best
way to apportion the various costs of rulemaking and decision-making.
The Louisiana mineral servitude has a rule limiting its non-productive
lifespan, giving the servitude-owner a hard boundary but with the benefit 
of an entire decade of leeway on production. Because of this forgiving 
span and the minimal requirement of any production at all, there is little
reason to sift through different fact scenarios to determine what counts as 
sufficient production. But with a mineral lease, the production condition 
demands contemporaneous and profitable production. And there are at
least some factual circumstances which suggest that the proper time span
for calling production “contemporaneous” is variable. As a pair of 
examples, oil and gas are sold with varying frequency, bringing in revenue 
at different rates, and some types of wells demand regular maintenance on
different sorts of schedules, incurring costs at different rates, and so on.214 
213. The author of this Article has negotiated many mineral leases, generally 
on behalf of lessors, and finds this to be a common expectation among lessors. 
214. Oil is typically stored in tank batteries near the well and is often sold out
of those batteries to a transporter, who moves the oil to a market by truck. Gas,
on the other hand, cannot be stored and so must be immediately diverted from the
well to a pipeline to reach a market. As a result, the schedules and contracts for 
selling the two different products can differ significantly. For instance, gas is often 
sold to a “gathering” company or interstate pipeline at a fixed price over short 
durations through “spot” sales arrangements, while oil is more often to sold to a
transporter on a regular weekly or monthly basis, at whatever the current market
rate. See 3 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 2 § 103. See also MARTIN & KRAMER,
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410 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
Varying combinations of even these two factors implicate different
possible ascriptions of “contemporaneous” in the vernacular, non-
technical usage. Facially, this suggests a fact-sensitive approach is 
appropriate. Courts must employ some time frame for either a subjective
or objective test, and the reasonable time period standard can be fashioned
into a more useful guide for selecting that time frame.
B. Setting the Outside Boundaries
The Clifton court forbid a focus on an “arbitrary” time period for the 
objective prong, but some time period obviously still must be employed– 
even if it is simply the entire life of the lease. The case law reveals that 
courts have struggled mightily with determining the possible outside
boundaries of any such time period. This problem precedes Clifton but the
two-prong test in Clifton aggravated the confusion. This Subpart analyzes 
both the earliest and latest possible points of the inquiry. 
Should the profitability of the lease prior to the end of the primary 
term ever be used in the analysis?215 The Paulus decision in Ohio intimated 
that revenues and expenses before the secondary term are irrelevant.216 
However, it is not clear that this is necessarily the case under the basic 
framework of the paying quantities question. If a lease is producing only 
marginally at the end of the primary term, there is an open question of 
whether a secondary term even exists; after all, the typical habendum 
clause only allows for such a term if there is production in paying 
quantities by the end of the primary term. So that sort of paying quantities
question necessarily looks to the production up to the end of the primary 
term. What is the relevant difference between this question and the Paulus
problem, where the lessee wished to count part of the primary term period 
into the mechanical evaluation of profitability? The lease could not 
terminate for failure to produce during the primary term, but that is a 
separate issue from whether any actual production during that period 
“counts” as part of a broader window of current production. Stated another
way, if pre-secondary term production could conceivably count against a
lessee (in evaluating whether there was sufficient production at the end of 
the primary term), why should it never conceivably count for the lessee (in
a Paulus situation)? There may be factual circumstances that render
primary term production irrelevant in particular cases, but there does not 
WILLIAMS & MEYER, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS (“spot purchases (or
sales) of gas”).
215. See discussion supra Part I (discussing the distinction between the
primary and secondary term of a mineral lease).
216. 94 N.E.3d 73, 96 (Ohio App. Ct. 2017).
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4112020] TIME PERIOD FOR A PAYING QUANTITIES ANALYSIS?
appear to be any a priori reason to confine the analysis to secondary term 
production in all cases. 
The terminal point of the analysis has received more attention.217 
When should the evaluation of profitability (under the objective prong)
and the efforts of the operator (under the subjective prong) end? Should 
profits or losses incurred after the suit is filed count? Several courts have 
considered such periods, such as the Pshigoda court in Texas.218 The
problem with including post-suit lease performance is that lessees often 
rationally scale back on efforts to maintain or increase profitability from a 
lease whose validity is under attack.219 Why invest money and effort into 
increasing profits now if the lessor is alleging that the lease terminated 
twenty years ago? On the other hand, the lessor might be similarly
prejudiced by post-filing performance—if the lessee ramps up efforts after
the suit is filed, the lessee might be able to persuade the court that the
recent productivity is more reflective of the lease’s current status. 
The best answer to this problem is that the “back end” boundary of the 
analysis should be fixed by the date which the lessor alleges is the day the
lease terminated. Post-lawsuit or post-demand lease performance is 
irrelevant to the question of whether the lease terminated on some date
prior to the filing of the lawsuit.220 Further, all production after the date of
alleged termination—whether prelawsuit or post—is irrelevant. Both 
Louisiana and Pennsylvania have taken this approach in Middleton v.
217. As in the discussions of the Pshigoda, Laddex, or Middleton decisions
herein.
218. Pshigoda v. Texaco, Inc., 703 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Tex. App. 1986) (stating
“The second time period, slightly over a year and encompassing the period when 
litigation was pending, is also long enough to accurately reflect a profitability 
period and, additionally provide a contrast with pre-suit performance.”).
219. For instance, see Noel v. Amoco Prod. Co., 826 F. Supp. 1000, 1015 
(W.D. La. 1993) (stating “The court concludes that the institution of suit by the
lessor for the total cancellation of the Noel leases prevented, for all practical
purposes, the lessee and its operator from maintaining and repairing the producing 
wells on the leases.”).
220. Other authors agree that post-demand or post-petition performance
should be excluded: 
Should the period between the time of a lawsuit is filed challenging the
perpetuation of a lease and the date of trial be included? Normally, it is 
clearly error by a court to inquire into the post-petition financial
performance of a lease when the petition amounts to unequivocal 
repudiation of the lease. . . .
See Thomas P. Battle, Lease Maintenance in the Face of Curtailed/Depressed 
Markets, 32 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. FOUND. INST. 14, § 14.05 (1986).
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EP221 222and Lang v. Weiss, respectively. Such an approach takes the
habendum clause seriously, by providing for a possible date of automatic
termination without the possibility of a subsequent equitable “cure” for 
that termination. Sometimes lessors are intentionally or unintentionally
ambiguous about when that termination occurred, but the negative
consequences of such ambiguity can cut both ways.223 As a result, the
clarity provided by more specific pleas of past termination accrues to the
advantage of all litigants and to the court deciding the issue. 
Unfortunately, the Clifton decision, and Laddex’s recent gloss on it, 
seems to threaten this commonsense solution. In Clifton, the court framed
the question as to whether “paying production from the lease has
ceased”—in the present tense—and barred consideration of any “arbitrary
period” of time.224 The Laddex court appeared to take this reasoning to its
logical end, agreeing with BP that “evaluating the question with respect to 
any particular time period violates Clifton.”225 It thus explicitly dispensed
with the reasonable time period limitation for the first prong, and pointed
out that the reasonable time period reference in Clifton was only as a factor 
in the second prong.226 Taken strictly, this implies that the “mechanical”
test applies to the entire history of the lease up to the point it is submitted
to the factfinder; a lease only fails that test if it operates at a net loss over 
its entire lifespan. It is unlikely that the Laddex court intended such a far-
reaching result and did not explicitly say as much. However, the fact that
this is even arguably a consistent extension of the court’s rationale is
troubling. If post-“slowdown” profitability is always relevant to a
determination of paying quantities evaluation, no matter how long, it is
difficult to conceive of a real role for the first prong of the Clifton test.
Does this not mean that later production can revive a lease that might
otherwise have terminated during a long slowdown in profitability?
Still, it is important to note that the Laddex court did not expressly
state that the analysis must be performed as of the date of trial, though BP 
did argue that this was the only sensible way to construe the “no
limitation” conception. There is room for a future Texas court to get 
around Laddex because of this silence. Further, the court’s rejection of any
221. Middleton v. EP Energy E & P Co., L.P 188 So. 3d 263 (La. Ct. App. 2d 
Cir.), writ denied sub nom. Middleton v. EP Energy E & P Co., L.F., 192 So. 3d
773 (La.), and writ denied, 192 So. 3d 774 (La. 2016).
222. 70 N.E.3d 625 (2016).
223. These problems were present in the Gloria’s Ranch v. Tauren matter. See
Martin, supra note 66, at 405.
224. 325 S.W.2d 684, 690 (1959) (emphasis added).
225. 513 S.W.3d 476, 485 (2017).
226. Id. at 486, n.10.
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temporal limitation on the mechanical prong could be construed as
dicta.227 For this Article’s purposes, the issue is important insofar as it
highlights the conceptual problems wrought by refusing to firmly fix the
analysis at the point of alleged lease termination. Whatever the appropriate 
period of time leading up to October 31, 2006, it was that date which the
lessor claimed was the day the lease terminated. Analyzing any 
profitability after that date implicitly means that the lease did not terminate 
on October 31, 2006—but that is a conclusion that can only come after an 
analysis of everything up to that point.
C. Development of the Reasonable Time Period Standard
A flexible standard is meaningless if it is not actually being flexed to 
different circumstances in broadly-predictable ways. It is hollow if there 
is no way of correlating, even in a very general way, those fact
circumstances to actual time periods. The way to make those correlations 
is by having criteria for what does count and does not count as a correct
application for a “reasonable” time period here. These criteria can come
through courts explaining exactly what made a particular period of time 
reasonable in light of the particular facts of a given case. Practically 
speaking, it will also require appellate determinations that the lower
court’s fixing of the period was unreasonable in at least some cases. If no 
one is ever wrong about applying the label “reasonable” in a given context, 
it can be fairly said to be an empty label in that context. 
Legal reasoning proceeds by use of categories and analogies, 
sometimes whether or not apt.228 A helpful way of looking at the time
227. The first line of attack by the court was that the jury charge improperly
served to focus the jury” on the 15-months, by implying that this was the
reasonable time period to consider. If the problem was just a faulty jury instruction 
which conflated a particular period with a reasonable period, the rest of the court’s 
ruling may be dicta. Laddex originally alleged a lease termination due to a
complete cessation of production from 2001 to 2002. It then amended several
times to allege both complete cessation of production and failure to produce in 
paying quantities over various periods, before ultimately settling on October 31,
2006 as the termination date. Perhaps making an unequivocal claim of that date 
at the inception of the suit would have forced the court’s hand. 
228. OIL AND GAS LAW FOR A NEW CENTURY: PRECEDENT AS PROLOGUE 98, 
102 (Patrick H. Martin ed., Matthew Bender 1997) (Go to Chapter Four, The Joint
Operating Agreement-An Unsettled Relationship?, by Patrick H. Martin).
Professor Martin emphasizes the unique role of analogy in law by stating: 
“Perhaps only lawyers can explain why a water pond is like a dynamite blast or 
an errant animal.” Id. (referencing Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 H. & C. 774, 159 Eng.
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component of the paying quantities test is through an analogical category
of reasonableness time limitations: waiting periods for “unreasonable”
searches and seizures under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The 
Supreme Court’s method in U.S. v. Banks is instructive.229 The police in 
that case, suspecting Mr. Banks was selling cocaine from his home, 
obtained a warrant to search the apartment.230 Upon arrival, they knocked 
on the door loudly and announced their presence.231 Mr. Banks was
showering and did not answer. After 15–20 seconds, the officers used a
battering ram and broke down the door.232 They discovered cocaine and 
other contraband. Mr. Banks argued that the officers waited an 
unreasonably short period of time before entering his home and therefore
violated his Fourth Amendment right. The Ninth Circuit crafted a four-
part classification scheme for vetting knock-and-announce entries, 
claiming that such a system would aid in the resolution of the question of 
whether the entry was reasonable under the circumstances.233 The 
Supreme Court reversed, emphasizing that the jurisprudence on
unreasonable searches consistently looks to the totality of circumstances 
of each case and eschewed bright-line rules.234 But this did not force the
Court to shy away from those circumstances. To the contrary, Justice
Souter’s opinion for the unanimous Court reviewed the totality of facts
with particularity and in light of the overarching point of the game:
protecting citizens against unreasonable searches.
In Banks, some of the factual circumstances were not relevant to the 
reasonableness of the delay; for instance, that Mr. Banks was in the shower
at the time of the entry was irrelevant because that fact was not known to
the police at the time.235 On the other hand, some of the circumstances
were relevant: the police suspected Banks of having cocaine, which could
be quickly disposed of if they tarried for very long.236 Had it been a piano,
perhaps 15 seconds would not have been reasonable. As the Supreme
Court stated, “Attention to cocaine rocks and pianos tells a lot about the 
chances of their respective disposal and its bearing on reasonable time. 
Rep. 737 (1865), rev’d in, Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), aff’d in,
Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868)).
229. 540 U.S. 31 (2003).
230. Id. at 33.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. United States v. Banks, 282 F.3d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 2002).
234. Banks, 540 U.S. at 36.
235. Id. at 39.
236. Id. at 40.
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4152020] TIME PERIOD FOR A PAYING QUANTITIES ANALYSIS?
Instructions couched in terms like ‘significant amount of time,’ and ‘an 
even more substantial amount of time,’ tell very little.”237 
Thus, the relevant factual circumstances should dictate how to 
determine reasonableness in light of our purpose. And the relevance of
some sets of facts will be dependent on the existence or nonexistence of
other sets of facts; they are interrelated and interdependent. That these are
all circumstances of fact, rather than of law, does not render them
insusceptible to judicial scrutiny. Under the Court’s logic, a ten-second 
delay after knocking in a stolen piano case with broadly-similar factual
circumstances to Banks would be unreasonable, even if the factfinder had 
determined otherwise. 
The Banks opinion illustrates how the reasonable time period analysis
should work out in the paying quantities domain: a court need neither 
construct artificial sets of putatively necessary or sufficient conditions, nor
offer overbroad platitudes.238 Instead, courts should explicitly identify 
which particular circumstances were relevant to the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of a given period. Related to this, appellate courts must
collectively tie these circumstances to particular periods of time. This will 
unquestionably require a set of policy choices; as argued herein, a time 
period can only be “reasonable” in light of prescriptive objectives. But if 
and when courts within a given jurisdiction can coalesce around those 
choices, the interested parties (lessors and lessees) will be able to better 
understand the legal limits of their relationship.
This Article takes the position that, for a paying quantities analysis,
the relevant fact conditions are few enough in type and effect that the range
of possible time periods should be relatively narrow under most normal
possible conditions. That is, there will not be many conceivable sets of
circumstances that would make one year appropriate for one lease and six 
years appropriate for another lease. That is because this Article takes a
relatively wide-apertured and rough-grained approach to the question as
more consistent with the fundamental contractual and policy imperatives 
behind automatic termination. But in any case, the most important way to
give greater sense to the issue is for courts to explain why they think
particular fact circumstances are relevant. This is a greater necessity for a 
reasonableness standard of this sort than in other contexts: people have 
significantly more familiarity with the background values and fact
scenarios implicated by cocaine busts or contract acceptance. 
237. Id. at 42.
238. Id. (“Instructions couched in terms like ‘significant amount of time’ . . .
tell very little.”).
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416 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
Appellate courts can give shape to how fact circumstances should 
matter in fixing a reasonable time period in general by deciding and 
discussing what fact circumstances actually did matter in fixing a 
particular period under consideration. In Dreher v. Cassidy Ltd. 
Partnership, for instance, the appellate court remanded to the trial court 
because the parties purportedly did not present evidence of why eight
months was a reasonable period of time under those circumstances. The 
court could have, instead, specified what kind of evidence that might be, 
given the factual record it did have on summary judgment. There were
certain facts already in the record: the age of the lease, the location, the
year of alleged termination, presumably the type of mineral produced, and
so forth. What further relevant fact conditions needed to be proven to show
that eight months was or was not reasonable? Simply pointing out why 
these fact circumstances, and the relations between them, were insufficient
in that case would have provided explanatory guidance without 
transforming the standard into a rule. While this elucidatory opportunity
is most obvious in a dispute like Dreher, it is available to courts and 
litigants at nearly every stage of a paying quantities fight. Courts can 
therefore give substance to the reasonable time period standard by 
explicitly correlating factual and legal circumstances to the time periods
employed in specific cases. This would necessitate a more direct narration 
of the reasons why certain periods were or were not reasonable, whether
during reversal or affirmance of a factfinder’s decision.
The Banks decision is again instructive: given certain fact conditions, 
it is possible to say that 15 seconds is unreasonable for a pilfered Steinway
but reasonable for a cocaine bust. It may be impossible to meaningfully 
distinguish between 15 and 30 seconds for the latter, and affirming courts
can note whether and why it is a close call on appeal. The same narrative 
process is available to appellate courts reviewing a paying quantities case:
“here’s what the relevant facts were, here’s the time period those
circumstances suggested as reasonable, and here’s why the lower court 
was right, wrong, or right enough in light of the ultimate purpose of the
standard.” Right now, statements of this sort are conspicuously absent
from the jurisprudence.
To this end, courts would be wise to pick a baseline range that is
usually applicable in light of the most widely-shared factual
circumstances. For example, Louisiana’s Second Circuit Court of Appeal 
noted in Gloria’s Ranch that the state’s courts tend to make the paying 
quantities evaluation over a 12-month to 18-month span.239 This is a
judicial observation, not a rule or even a standard, but it will have an 
239. 223 So. 3d 1202, 1211 (2017).
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4172020] TIME PERIOD FOR A PAYING QUANTITIES ANALYSIS?
impact on how lessors and lessees behave in the face of litigation or 
potential litigation. If a lessor knows that he will be unlikely to establish 
an operating loss for more than twelve months in normal conditions, and
he and his lawyer see nothing making the lease conditions abnormal, that 
lessor is much less likely to file suit in the first place. An operator who 
sees operating losses on a certain lease for three straight years will be more
willing to bargain with the lessor for a settlement, if the operator 
understands that the normal range tends to be capped at around half that 
time. This influence will exist, to some degree, whether the second prong 
can save an unprofitable lease (as in Texas) or can kill a barely profitable 
one (as in Louisiana). A lessee in a Texas-type jurisdiction recognizes that 
its falling outside of profitability for much longer than a “baseline” range
means that it will be unlikely to win the easy way and may be more willing 
to settle than attempt to win the harder way. By providing at least some
degree of predictability, a more constricted range of time periods for the 
paying quantities analysis can reduce or prevent the costs of litigation. 
Identifying a “normal” range of plausible dates seems difficult when the
actual range of accounting periods chosen in past cases varies wildly and
there is little apparent rhyme or reason to those periods, but this is when
courts must embrace their policy-fixing, or at least policy-framing, power.
Ultimately, a court with precedential authority in a given jurisdiction should
affirmatively choose a span of time that operates as a “center of gravity” for
the analysis. And though it is a policy choice, it does need to be a wholly
arbitrary selection. The 12-month to18-month span referenced in Gloria’s
Ranch is both short enough and long enough to comport with the broad 
guiding principles enunciated in the jurisprudence and implicit in the lease 
contract: it is long enough to encompass the seasonal cycles for natural gas
and oil, takes into account tax considerations for the lessee, and does not
require a look down the road that far exceeds ordinary notions of 
contemporaneity. Simpson has proposed a similar approach, arguing that
courts should look simultaneously to the yearly seasonal cycle and the two-
year cycle for oil wells.240 There are varying horizons for what counts as
“current” in our everyday lives, but few people think of possible happenings,
say, a seven years down the line as being anything but speculation. That an
oil company might have a seven-year plan for profitability or might one day 
reasonably think that the market is turning after seven bad years, is probably 
not an expectation shared by the parties at the beginning of the lease
relationship. Certain factual circumstances will alter these considerations in
one direction or another, and those circumstances should be articulated by
courts facing them. This approach recognizes that the issue is not in 
240. Simpson, supra note 8, at 382.
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identifying one platonically-correct time period, or a time span that is 
somehow inherent to the concept of “reasonableness.” Neither exists.
Instead, it is about giving sense to an existing but underdetermined facet of
a legal standard. 
CONCLUSION
The basic thesis here is not that appellate judges are solely responsible 
for further developing the accounting period standard. Instead, it is a task 
that should develop through courts as broader institutions, with litigants 
initially selecting periods and providing reasons to trial courts, who make
the fact-finding decisions, and with appellate judges specifically
articulating what made the chosen periods reasonable or unreasonable.
Subsequent litigants and courts then have the benefit of an explicit 
rationale for a time period under a given set of facts, which can be 
compared or contrasted with the facts of a future dispute. That this sort of 
continuous clarification has not happened yet is likely the result of an odd
feedback loop: courts have typically refrained from directly discussing the
time period issue, giving litigants little legal precedent to base their
arguments on and resulting in less judicial discussion of relevant legal 
conflicts. For a long time, the time period issue was nearly hidden in plain 
sight. Evolution occurs through a combination of selective pressures and
chance. With the spike in lease litigation after the shale explosion of the 
mid-late 2000s, a few high-profile decisions implicating the appropriate 
time period resulting from that litigation, and increased scholarly scrutiny
of the issue, the environment may be ripe for development.
